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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Leonardo Melosi
Frank Schorfheide and Francis X. Diebold
In the rst chapter, I develop and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium
model with imperfectly informed rms in the sense of Woodford (2002). The
model has two aggregate shocks: a monetary policy shock and a technology
shock. Firms observe idiosyncratic noisy signals about these shocks and face
strategic complementarities in price setting. In this environment, agents"fore-
casting the forecasts of others" can produce realistic dynamics of model vari-
ables, with associated highly persistent real e¤ects of monetary shocks and
delayed e¤ects of such shocks on ination. The paper provides a full Bayesian
analysis of the model, revealing that it can capture the persistent propagation
of monetary shocks only by predicting that rms acquire less information about
monetary policy than about technology. To further investigate this nding, I
augment the model to allow rms to optimally choose how much information to
acquire about the two shocks, subject to an information-processing constraint
à la Sims (2003). This constraint sets the rate at which rms can substitute
pieces of information about the two shocks. I nd that, in the estimated model,
v
rmsmarginal value of the information about monetary policy shocks is much
higher than that about technology shocks. I argue that this nding admits
two alternative interpretations. First, rms acquire implausibly too little in-
formation about the monetary shock in the estimated model. Second, the rate
of substitution implied by the information-processing constraint is inconsistent
with the data. In the third chapter, I develop a model where rms have incom-
plete and dispersed information to study how monetary policy a¤ects agents
beliefs. I estimate the model through Bayesian methods and nd that dispersed
information has two main implications for monetary policy. First, it reduces
the real e¤ects of money. Second, it raises the output loss associated with a
monetary policy of disination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I conduct a formal econometric analysis of dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models where rms have incomplete information. In the rst chapter, I
develop and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfectly
informed rms in the sense of Woodford (2002). I provide an econometric in-
vestigation of whether the model can be reliably used for studying the propaga-
tion of monetary disturbances to macroeconomic variables in the US economy.
The model has two aggregate shocks: a monetary policy shock and a technol-
ogy shock. Firms observe idiosyncratic noisy signals about these shocks and
face strategic complementarities in price setting. In this environment, agents
"forecasting the forecasts of others" can produce realistic dynamics of model
variables, with associated highly persistent real e¤ects of monetary shocks and
delayed e¤ects of such shocks on ination. I provide a full Bayesian analysis
1
of the model, revealing that, although it is highly-stylized, it provides a useful
laboratory for studying the e¤ects of monetary shocks. Furthermore, I nd that
rms acquire much less information about monetary policy than that about
technology in the estimated model.
In the second chapter, I investigate the plausibility of the nding that rms
acquire much less information about monetary policy than that about technol-
ogy. To this end, I augment the model to allow rms to optimally choose how
much information to acquire about the two shocks, subject to an information-
processing constraint that is widely used in the literature of rational inattention
propelled by Sims (1998, 2003). This constraint sets the rate at which rms
can substitute pieces of information about the two shocks. I nd that, in the
estimated model, rmsmarginal value of the information about monetary pol-
icy shocks is much higher than that about technology shocks. Hence, I argue
that the estimated model predicts that rms acquire implausibly too little in-
formation about monetary policy. This result calls for further research on the
substitution rate of information that rms actually face.
The third chapter addresses the following question: does monetary policy
play a role in coordinating agentsination expectations? To answer this ques-
tion the essay develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
where rms have heterogenous ination expectations. In the model, monetary
2
policy can work as a focal point that helps coordinating expectations among
rms. I will perform Bayesian estimation and evaluation of the model. The
main ndings of this chapter are two. First, the presence of imperfect informa-
tion reduces the real e¤ects of monetary policy. Second, the output loss asso-
ciated with a monetary policy of disination (i.e., a negative shock to central
banks ination targeting) is larger when one considers imperfect information.
3
Chapter 2
A Model of Incomplete Common
Knowledge
A number of inuential empirical studies of the U.S. economy have documented
that money disturbances have highly persistent real e¤ects and delayed im-
pacts on ination (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999, Stock and Wat-
son, 2001). The conventional approach to explaining this evidence relies upon
sticky-price models (e.g., Galí and Gertler, 1999, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005, and Smets andWouters, 2007). These
models can generally account for the highly persistent e¤ects of monetary shocks
only with su¢ ciently large costs of price adjustment. Such sizable costs imply
a frequency of price adjustments that is inconsistent with some evidence from
4
the micro-data on price changes (Bils and Klenow, 2004).1
Woodford (2002) proposes an alternative modeling approach: imperfect-
common-knowledge models. In his price-setting model, monopolistic produc-
ers set their prices under limited information and strategic complementarities.
Firms observe idiosyncratic noisy signals regarding the state of monetary policy
and solve a signal-extraction problem in order to keep track of the model vari-
ables. Since the signal is noisy, rms do not immediately learn of the occurrence
of monetary disturbances. As a result, the price level fails to adjust enough to
entirely neutralize the real e¤ects of nominal shocks. Moreover, because of
the idiosyncratic nature of the signals, in the aftermath of a shock, rms are
also uncertain about what other rms know that other rms know...that other
rms know about that shock. Owing to strategic complementarities in price-
setting, a problem of forecasting the forecasts of others of the type envisioned
by Townsend (1983b) arises. This feature of the model has been shown to am-
plify the persistence in economic uctuations (Townsend, 1983a, 1983b, Hellwig,
2002, Adam, 2008, Angeletos and LaO, 2008, and Lorenzoni, forthcoming A)
and in the propagation of monetary disturbances to real variables and prices
(Phelps, 1970, Adam, 2007, Gorodnichenko, 2008, and Lorenzoni, forthcoming
B).2 Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that in this model prices adjust fre-
1A modelling solution that preserves sticky prices and is not in conict with micro-data
on price-setting is developed by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005).
2See Mankiw and Reis (2002a, 2002b, 2006, 2007), and Reis (2006a, 2006b, 2009) for
models with information frictions that do not feature imperfect common knowledge but can
5
quently, but move only gradually to their complete information levels. Thus
the resolution proposed by Woodford (2002) is appealing in that it can poten-
tially explain sluggish adjustments of macro variables without necessarily being
in discord with the micro evidence on price changes.
This chapter addresses the question: can a version of the imperfect-common-
knowledge model (ICKM) account for the persistent e¤ects of monetary shocks
we observe in the data? The answer to this question is yes but with one caveat
that will be addressed in the second chapter. To get this answer, the essay pro-
ceeds by constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with two shocks: a monetary policy shock and an aggregate technology shock.
Firms receive one idiosyncratic noisy signal about each of these two shocks and
face strategic complementarities in price-setting. The signal-extraction problem
and the price-setting problem are similar to Woodford (2002). I estimate the
ICKM and a vector autoregressive model (VAR) through Bayesian methods. I
consider the impulse response functions (IRFs) implied by this statistical model
as an accurate description of the propagation of monetary shocks in the data.
From a Bayesian perspective, this conjecture is sensible because the VAR turns
out to dominate the ICKM in terms of time series t (Schorfheide, 2000). I then
compare the IRFs of output and ination to a monetary shock implied by the
ICKM to those implied by the VAR. I nd that the ICKM successfully captures
generate sizable persistence.
6
the sluggish and hump-shaped response of output and ination to monetary
shocks implied by the VAR. Moreover, the estimated signal-to-noise ratio of
monetary policy is smaller than that of technology by a factor of six. The rea-
son is that the ICKM generates highly sluggish responses to monetary shocks
only if rms acquire so little information about monetary policy.
Finally, this chapter investigates what the imperfect-common-knowledge
mechanism of generating persistence adds to or takes away from a more popular
mechanism based on Calvo sticky prices (Calvo, 1983). To this end, I consider
a model (henceforth, Calvo model) that di¤ers from the ICKM in two main
respects: (1) rms are perfectly informed, and (2) rms can re-optimize their
prices only at random periods, as in Calvo (1983). I estimate the Calvo model
through Bayesian techniques. First, I nd that, unlike the ICKM and the VAR,
the Calvo model fails to generate hump-shaped responses of output and ina-
tion to monetary shocks. Second, the ICKM ts the data moderately better
than the Calvo model.
2.1 The Model Economy
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce the maintained assump-
tions of the ICKM. Second, I show the problems of agents in the model. Third,
I discuss how to detrend and log-linearize the model around the deterministic
steady state equilibrium. Fourth, I analyze the source of persistence in the log-
7
linearized ICKM. Fifth, I briey discuss the challenges one faces when solving
models with imperfect common knowledge. Sixth, I describe how to modify the
ICKM so that the information frictions are replaced with nominal rigidities à
la Calvo (1983).
2.1.1 Maintained Assumptions
The economy is populated by perfectly competitive nal-good producers (or,
more briey, producers), households, a nancial intermediary, a monetary au-
thority (or central bank), and a continuum (0; 1) of intermediate-good rms (or,
more briey, rms). Households derive utility from consumption and disutility
from supplying labor to rms. Furthermore, households face a cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint, requiring that they must have su¢ cient cash available before
they can buy consumption goods. Firms set the prices of their intermediate
goods in a monopolistic competitive market. Firms do not bear any cost when
they change their prices and do not accumulate capital. Furthermore, there are
two shocks: an aggregate technology shock and a monetary policy shock.
The information structure of the model can be summarized as follows. First,
all information is publicly available to every agent. Second, rms cannot attend
perfectly to all available information. Third, rms face limitations on the overall
amount of information they can process. As in Woodford (2002), information-
processing frictions are modelled by assuming that rms do not observe past
8
and current realizations of any model variables. They solely observe signals
about the two shocks. For tractability, it is assumed that the other agents (i.e.,
nal-good producers, households, the nancial intermediary, and the monetary
authority) perfectly observe the past and the current realizations of all the model
variables.
At the beginning of period t, the households inherit the entire money stock
of the economy, Mt 1. Shocks and signals realize. Households decide how much
moneyDt to deposit at the nancial intermediary after observing current-period
innovations to technology and monetary shocks. These deposits yield interest
at a rate of Rt   1. The nancial intermediary receives householdsdeposits
and a monetary injection from the monetary authority, which it lends to rms
at a xed fee  . The rms observe signals, set prices, hire labor service from
households, and then produce. They use the liquidity facilities provided by the
nancial intermediary at the xed fee  so as to pay wages WtHt, where Wt is
the nominal hourly wage, and Ht is hours worked. Householdscash balance
increases to Mt 1   Dt +WtHt. The CIA constraint requires that households
pay for all consumption purchases with the accumulated cash balances. Firms
sell their goods to producers that integrate them into a nal good that they sell
to households. Firms also pay back their loans, Li;t. Finally, households receive
back their deposits inclusive of interest and dividends from both rms, t, and
the nancial intermediary, bt .
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2.1.2 Final-Good Producers
The representative nal-good producer combines a continuum of intermediate
goods, Yi;t, by using the technology:
Yt =
Z 1
0
(Yi;t)
 1
 di
 
 1
where Yt is the amount of the nal good produced at time t, the parameter 
represents the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good and is assumed
to be strictly larger than one. The producer takes the input prices, Pi;t, and
output price, Pt, as given. Prot maximization implies that the demand for
intermediate goods is:
Yi;t =

Pi;t
Pt
 
Yt
where the competitive price of the nal good, Pt, is given by
Pt =
Z
(Pi;t)
1  di
 1
1 
: (2.1)
2.1.3 The Representative Household
The representative household derives utility from consuming the nal good, Ct,
and disutility from hours worked, Ht, and maximizes
10
max
fCt;Ht;Mt;Dtg
Et
1X
s=0
s
"
lnCt+s   H
1+
t+s
1 + 
#
(2.2)
such that
PtCt Mt 1  Dt +WtHt (2.3)
0  Dt (2.4)
Mt = (Mt 1 +WtHt  Dt   PtCt) +RtDt +t +bt (2.5)
where  is the discount factor,  > 0 is the Frisch labor elasticity, and  is a
parameter that a¤ects the marginal utility of leisure.
The rst constraint is the CIA constraint requiring that the household has
to hold money up-front to nance its consumption. The second constraint
prevents households from borrowing from the nancial intermediary. The third
constraint is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of consumption varieties. The fourth
constraint is the law of motion of householdsmoney holdings.
2.1.4 The Financial Intermediary
The nancial intermediary solves the trivial static problem:
11
max
fLt;Dtg
(1 Rt)Dt +Xt +   I fLt > 0g (2.6)
such that
Lt  Xt +Dt (2.7)
where Lt is the aggregate amount of liquidity supplied to rms Lt =
R
Li;tdi,
Xt = Mt+1  Mt is the monetary injection, I fg is an indicator function that
has the value one if the statement within curly brackets is true.  is a xed fee
the intermediary receives from rms.
The nancial intermediary lends cash to rms so that they can pay wages
before households consume. This timing assumption allows households to use
the cash from their current labor income to nance current consumption. This
feature of the model makes the labor supply depend only on current variables
and substantially simplies the rmssignal-extraction problem. Replacing the
xed fee  with an equilibrium interest rate would introduce forward-looking
variables in the problem of rms and would unnecessarily complicate the signal-
extraction problem.
2.1.5 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority lets the money stock Mt grow at rate
12
 lnMt = (1  m)M0 + m lnMt 1 + m"m;t (2.8)
with "m;t v N (0; 1) and where  stands for the rst-di¤erence operator, the
degree of smoothness in conducting monetary policy m is such that m 2 [0; 1).
M0 is a parameter that represents the long-run average growth rate of money.
Equation (2.8) can be interpreted as a simple monetary policy rule without
feedbacks. The innovations "m;t capture unexpected changes in the growth rate
of money. Finally, it is useful to denote:
mt  lnMt  M0  t (2.9)
Finally, market clearing for the monetary market requires that:
lnMt = lnYt + lnPt (2.10)
2.1.6 Intermediate-Good Firms
The expected value of intermediate-good rm is prot conditional on the history
of signals observed by rm i at time t, zti, is given by:
E

tQt (Pi;tYi;t  WtNi;t   I fLi;tg) jzti

(2.11)
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where Qt is the time 0 value of one unit of the numeraire in period t to the
representative household. Yi;t is the amount of intermediate goods i demanded
by the nal-good producers at time t:
Yi;t =

Pi;t
Pt
 
Yt (2.12)
Ni;t is the labor input demanded by rm i at time t. The production function
is
Yi;t = AtN

i;t (2.13)
where  2 (0; 1) and At is the level of technology that follows an exogenous
process:
lnAt = A0 + lnAt 1 + a"a;t (2.14)
"a;t v N (0; 1). The technology shocks, "a;t, are assumed to be orthogonal to
monetary shocks, "m;t, at all leads and lags. I denote the loans of rm i at time
t as Li;t. Firms borrow liquidity from the nancial intermediary in order to pay
their nominal labor costs:
Li;t = WtNi;t (2.15)
They are charged with a xed fee  for this service. Similar to Woodford (2002),
rm is signals are dened as:
14
zi;t =
2664 mt
at
3775+
2664 ~m 0
0 ~a
3775 ei;t (2.16)
where zi;t  [zm;i;t; za;i;t]0, at  lnAt   A0  t, ei;t  [em;i;t; ea;i;t]0 and ei;t iidv
N (0; I2). Note that at and mt are the exogenous state variables of the model
and the signal noises em;i;t and ea;i;t are assumed to be iid across rms and time.
Furthermore, I assume that the two signals are orthogonal. This may be consid-
ered a strong assumption. After all, rms might learn about the state of mon-
etary policy mt from observing the signals concerning the state of technology
at (i.e., za;i;t). I nd, however, that relaxing this assumption of orthogonality
of signals does not substantially a¤ect the main predictions of the estimated
model.
In every period t, rms observe the history of their signals, zti, and choose
their prices, Pi;t, so as to maximize their expected current prots (2.11) subject
to equations (2.12)-(2.16) by taking the stochastic discount factor, Qt, and the
nominal wage, Wt, as exogenous. The equilibrium laws of motion of all model
variables are assumed to be common knowledge among rms.
I will log-linearize the price-setting equation around the deterministic steady
state to simplify the signal-extraction issues. Furthermore, it is important to
emphasize that I assume that at time 0 rms are endowed with an innite se-
quence of signals, that is zti = fzi;gt= 1. This assumption simplies the analy-
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sis in that rms will have the same Kalman gain matrix in their signal-extraction
problem. Furthermore, this matrix can be shown to be time-invariant. This as-
sumption makes the task of solving the model easier.
2.1.7 Detrending, Log-Linear Approximation
The exogenous processes (2.8) and (2.14) induce both a deterministic and a
stochastic trend to all endogenous variables, except labor. I will detrend the
non-stationary variables before log-linearizing the models. It is useful to dene
the stationary variables as follows:
yt  Yt
At
; pi;t  Pi;t
Pt
(2.17)
In order to log-linearize the model, I take the following steps. First, I de-
rive the price-setting equation by solving rmsproblem (2.11)-(2.16). Second,
I transform the variables according to the denitions (2.17). Third, I log-
linearize the resulting price-setting equation around the deterministic steady
state. Fourth, I aggregate the log-linearized price-setting equation across rms
and obtain the law of motion of price level. Fifth, the law of motion of real
output can be easily obtained from combining the law of motion of price level
and equation (2.10).
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2.1.8 Source of Persistence in the ICKM
Let me introduce some notation. By convention, rm is expectations of order
zero about the state of monetary policy are the state itself, that is,m(0)t (i)  mt.
Firm is rst-order expectations about the state of monetary policy are denoted
by m(1)tjt (i)  E [mtjI it ]. Average rst-order expectations about the state of
monetary policy can be computed as follows m(1)tjt 
R
m
(1)
tjt (i) di. Firm is
second-order expectations are rm is rst-order expectations of the average
rst-order expectations, or more concisely m(2)tjt (i)  E
h
m
(1)
tjt jI it
i
. By rolling
this argument forward I obtain the average j-th order expectation, for any
j  0;
m
(j)
tjt 
Z
m
(j)
tjt (i) di (2.18)
Moreover, rm is (j + 1)-th order expectations about the state of monetary
policy, for any j  0, are:
m
(j+1)
tjt (i)  E
h
m
(j)
tjt jI it
i
(2.19)
The speed of adjustment of variables to a shock is a¤ected by the signal-
to-noise ratio associated with that shock and the strategic complementarity
in price-setting. The strategic complementarity in price-setting measures the
extent to which rms want to react to the expected average price Pt. The
degree of strategic complementarity turns out to be determined by 1 , where
17
  ( + 1) 1=    1   1+ 1. See Appendix A.
In Appendix A, the law of motion of price level is:
lnPt =
" 1X
j=0
(1  )j 

m
(j+1)
tjt   a(j+1)tjt
#
  ln y +M0t  A0t (2.20)
where m(j)tjt and a
(j)
tjt are the average j-th order expectations about the state of
monetary policy and technology at time t and y is the steady-state value of
the detrended output, yt. From equation (2.10) and equation (2.20) and after
straightforward manipulations, it is easy to derive the law of motion of real
output:
lnYt =
"
mt  
1X
j=0
(1  )j m(j+1)tjt
#
+
1X
j=0
(1  )j a(j+1)tjt   ln y + A0t (2.21)
Note that both price level and output are a¤ected by weighted averages3 of the
innite hierarchy of higher-order expectations about the exogenous states.
Equation (2.21) shows that monetary shocks have real e¤ects as long as
they are not fully anticipated by the average higher-order expectations of rms.
More specically, if the realization of mt is common knowledge among rms,
then m(j)t = mt for all j and the terms inside the square brackets cancel out.
3I restrict  2 (0; 2) so that weights (1  )j  are absolutely summable.
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This shows that if monetary policy is common knowledge among rms, money
is neutral in the model.
Equations (2.20)-(2.21) make it clear that the more sluggishly the weighted
averages adjust to shocks, the more persistent the e¤ects of shocks upon price
and output are. The sluggishness of the weighted averages to shocks depends
on the speed of adjustment of higher-order expectations. Sluggish adjustment
of higher-order expectations depends on the signal-to-noise ratios that inuence
the precision of signals.4 The more imprecise the signals are, the more sluggishly
the average expectations of every order will respond to shocks. Thus, the signal-
to-noise ratios are a source of persistence in the model.
The strategic complementarity (i.e. 1  ) inuences the persistence of out-
put and ination by a¤ecting the relative weights in the weighted averages of
higher-order expectations. More precisely, the larger the strategic complemen-
tarity is, the bigger the weights of the average expectations of higher order are.
The economic intuition is that the degree of strategic complementarity a¤ects
how strongly rms want to react to prices set by other rms. The stronger
rms reaction to other rmspricing behavior is, the more they care about
what other rms think that other rms think...about the exogenous state of the
economy. In other words, strategic complementarity is the factor triggering the
4Since, in the ICKM, rms observe two orthogonal signals, the speed of propagation may
di¤er between the two shocks. Evidence that macroeconomic variables react at di¤erent speed
to monetary and to technology shocks is documented in Paciello (2009).
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mechanism of forecasting the forecasts of others.
It is important to emphasize that the signal structure (2.16) implies that sig-
nals provide less and less information about expectations of higher and higher
order. Therefore, the higher the order of average expectations, the more slug-
gishly they will adjust to shocks. Since larger strategic complementarity raises
the weights associated with the average expectations of higher order in equa-
tions (2.20)-(2.21), it boosts the persistence of output and ination responses
to shocks. Thus, for any given degree of information incompleteness, strate-
gic complementarity plays a crucial role in amplifying the persistence in the
propagation of shocks.
2.1.9 Model Solution
When one characterizes rational expectation equilibria (REE) in models with in-
complete information, a typical challenge is dealing with an innite-dimensional
state vector (innite regress)5 (Townsend, 1983b). The reason is that the laws
of motion of innitely many higher-order expectations have to be characterized
in order to solve the model. This task is clearly unmanageable. In my ICKM,
this problem arises when there is strategic complementarity in price-setting (i.e.,
1  > 0). Yet, here, this issue can be elegantly resolved as in Woodford (2002),
since it is possible to re-dene the state vector of the model as a weighted av-
5See Nimark (2009) for a thorough explanation of this problem.
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erage of innitely many higher-order expectations.6 This leads to a state space
of very small dimension. A detailed description of the method that numerically
solves the model is in Appendix B. The solution method turns out to be fast and
robust so that I can evaluate the likelihood at several points of the parameter
space. This leads to accurate estimates of model parameters.
2.1.10 The Calvo Model
In the Calvo model all agents (i.e., nal-good producers, households, the nan-
cial intermediary, the monetary authority, the intermediate-good rms) per-
fectly observe the past and current realizations of the model variables. More-
over, the price charged by each intermediate-good rm is re-optimized only at
random periods. The key (simplifying) assumption is that the probability that
a given rm will optimally adjust its price within a particular period is indepen-
dent of the state of the model, the current price charged, and how long ago it
was last re-optimized. Specically, only a fraction (1  p) of rms re-optimize
their prices, while the remaining p fraction adjusts them to the steady-state
ination . The problem of the rms that are allowed to re-optimize their
prices at time t is:
6Di¤erent methods have been developed to solve dynamic models with incomplete infor-
mation. Following Townsend (1983b), the customary approach of solving this class of models
is to assume that the realizations of states at some arbitrary distant point in the past are
perfectly revealed. Rondina and Walker (2009) have challenged this approach by showing that
such a truncation reveals the entire history of the realizations of states to agents, regardless
of the point of truncation. See Nimark (2008) for a truncation-based method that preserves
the recursive structure.
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max
Pi;t
Et
1X
s=0

sp
t+sQt+sjt (sPi;t  MCt+s)Yi;t+s   I fLi;t > 0g

(2.22)
such that
Yi;t+s =

sPi;t
Pt+s
 
Yt+s (2.23)
where Qt+sjt is the marginal utility of a unit of the numeraire at time t + s in
terms of the utility of the representative household at time t,  is the steady-
state (gross) ination rate, andMCt+s stands for the nominal marginal costs in
period t+ s. The price level is given by:
P 1 t =
h
(1  p)P (1 )t + p (Pt 1)1 
i
(2.24)
In the Calvo model, the speed of adjustment of variables to shocks is deter-
mined by the size of the Calvo parameter p and the strategic complementar-
ity parameter, . I detrend the non-stationary variables and log-linearize the
model around the deterministic steady state. I obtain the standard New Key-
nesian Phillips curve, whose slope, pc, depends on a function of parameters:
pc = (1  p) (1  p)=p.
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2.2 Empirical Analysis
I t the ICKM to observations on output and price level. I place a prior distri-
bution on parameters and conduct Bayesian inference. I present the data set,
the measurement equations, the prior distributions and the posterior distribu-
tions for model parameters. I then conduct a Bayesian evaluation of whether
the ICKM provides an accurate description of the propagation mechanism of
monetary shocks to output and ination. To do that, I introduce a largely para-
meterized VAR model. I conjecture that if the response of output and ination
to monetary shocks implied by the ICKM is similar to the one implied by the
VAR, then the ICKM provides an accurate description of the propagation of
monetary disturbances. From a Bayesian perspective, this conjecture is sensi-
ble as long as the VAR model attains a higher posterior probability than the
ICKM, as pointed out in Schorfheide (2000). I verify that this is indeed true by
comparing the marginal data densities of the ICKM and the VAR.
Finally, I also estimate the Calvo model and compare the response of output
and ination to monetary policy shocks implied by this model with that of the
ICKM. This comparison would allow me to assess what the ICK mechanism of
generating persistence adds to or takes away from the more popular mechanism
based on Calvo sticky prices.
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2.2.1 The Data
The data are quarterly and range from the third quarter of 1954 to the fourth
quarter of 2005. I use the U.S. per capita real GDP and the U.S. GDP deator
from Haver Analytics (Haver mnemonics are in italics). Per capita real GDP is
obtained by dividing the nominal GDP (GDP) by the population 16 years and
older (LN16N ) and deating using the chained-price GDP deator (JGDP).
The GDP deator is given by the appropriate series (JGDP).
2.2.2 Measurement Equations
Denote the U.S. per capita real GDP, and the U.S. GDP deator as Yt; and Pt,
respectively. The measurement equations are given by equations (2.20)-(2.21).
The Kalman lter can be used to evaluate the likelihood function of the
models. Yet, the lter must be initialized and a distribution for the state vector
in period t = 0 has to be specied. As far as the vector of stationary state vari-
ables is concerned, I use their unconditional distributions. I cannot initialize the
vector of non-stationary state variables (i.e. mt; at) in the same manner, since
their unconditional variance is not dened. I follow the approach introduced
by Chang, Doh, and Schorfheide (2007), who propose to factorize the initial
distribution as p (s1;t) p (s2;t), where s1;t and s2;t are the vector of stationary and
non-stationary variables, respectively. They suggest setting the rst compo-
nent p (s1;t) equal to the unconditional distribution of s1;t, whereas the second
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component p (s2;t) is absorbed into the specication of the prior.
2.2.3 Prior Distributions
Given the observables presented in section 2.2.1, it is easy to show that the Frisch
labor elasticity, , the demand elasticity, , and the technology parameter, ,
cannot be separately identied in the log-linearized ICKM. Nonetheless, I can
estimate the parameter  that a¤ects the strategic complementarity in price-
setting. Furthermore, the parameter, , and the discount factor, ; drop out
when I log-linearize the ICKM7. After log-linearization, the set of identiable
parameters in the ICKM is:
I  (m; A0;M0; ; m; a; ~m; ~a) (2.25)
Table 2.1 reports the prior medians and 90% credible intervals of the parameters
of the ICKM.
Since I do not have data on the degree of strategic complementarity8 and the
parameter  is very crucial for the persistence in the model (see section 2.1.8),
I will set a broad prior for this parameter with the aim of learning its value
from the likelihood function. If the Frisch labor-supply elasticity, , is equal to
7See appendices A and B.
8There are studies (e.g., Rotemberg andWoodford, 1997) that quantify the degree of strate-
gic complementarity in the U.S. However, they use a data set that is likely to be collinear to the
one used in the paper. Using such information to formulate the prior would be controversial.
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Table 2.1: Prior Distributions
Name Range Density Median 90% Interval
m [0; 1) Beta 0:50 [0:17; 0:0:82]
A0 R Normal 0:00 [ 0:41; 0:41]
M0 R Normal 0:00 [ 0:41; 0:41]
 [0; 1) Beta 0:41 [0:21; 0:60]
100m R+ InvGamma 2:0 [0:43; 12:87]
100a R+ InvGamma 0:7 [0:51; 0:87]
100~m R+ InvGamma 5:01 [2:12; 7:91]
100~a R+ InvGamma 1:06 [0:24; 1:87]
pc R+ Gamma 0:12 [0:00; 0:22]
 [0; 1) Beta 0:99 [0:98; 0:99]
0:5 (Ríos-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeulàlia-Llopis,
2009) and the technology parameter, , is equal to 0:65 (Cooley and Prescott,
1995), then the 90% credible interval for the parameter  includes mark-ups
ranging from 5% to 23%.
Market clearing for the monetary market implies that the stock of money
Mt is equal to nominal output. See equation (2.10). Hence, the autoregressive
parameter of monetary policy, m, the standard deviation of the monetary policy
shock, m, and the trendM0 can be estimated by using presample observations
of the (detrended) U.S. per capita real GDP and the (detrended) U.S. GDP
deator. This presample data set is obtained from Haver Analytics and ranges
from the rst quarter of 1949 to the second quarter of 1954.
The prior of the standard deviation of the technology shock, a, is centered
at 0:007. This value is the standard deviation of the Solow residual and is
standard in the real-business cycle literature (Kydland and Prescott, 1986).
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In absolute terms, I set the priors for standard deviations of signal noise, ~m,
and ~a, so as to ensure that signals are quite informative about the business-
cycle-frequency variations of model variables.9 In relative terms, these prior
specications are chosen so as to make the two signals equally informative about
the corresponding exogenous state variables.10
Table 2.2 presents the implied prior distributions for the strategic comple-
mentarity, 1 , and the signal-to-noise ratios, m=~m and a=~a. As discussed
in section 2.1.9, these parameter values crucially inuence the persistence in the
model. Priors for these parameters are very uninformative as I want to learn
their values from the likelihood. I x the discount factor  is xed so as to
match the long-run average real interest rate.
Table 2.2: Implied Prior Distributions (ICKM)
Name ICKM
Median 90% Interval
1   strategic complementarity 0:59 [0:40; 0:79]
m=~m signal-to-noise ratio MP 0:53 [0:06; 3:15]
a=~a signal-to-noise ratio tech. 0:95 [0:17; 1:88]
As far as the log-linearized Calvo model is concerned, the parameter set is:
C  (m; A0;M0; m; a; pc; ) (2.26)
9We achieve that by setting the prior medians of the coherences between the process of
the state variables, in rst di¤erence, and their corresponding signals such that these are not
smaller than 0:50 at business-cycle frequencies (3-5 years). The coherence ranges from 0 to 1
and measures the degree to which two stationary stochastic processes are jointly inuenced
by cycles of a given frequency (Hamilton, 1994).
10I quantify the amount of information that signals convey about the two exogenous states
as in Sims (2003). The formal denition of this measure is provided in section 4.1.
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In Table 2.1 the priors for these parameters are reported. I use the same prior
distributions for those parameters that are common to the ICKM. My priors
reect the beliefs that the slope of the Phillips curve, pc, ranges from 0:00
to 0:22. This range includes values that are supported by several studies that
estimate the slope of the Phillips curve, as surveyed by Schorfheide (2008).
2.2.4 Posterior Distributions
Given the priors and the likelihood functions implied by the ICKM and the
Calvo model, a closed-form solution for the posterior distributions for para-
meters cannot be derived. However, I am able to evaluate the posteriors nu-
merically through the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. How these
procedures apply to macro DSGE models is exhaustively documented by An
and Schorfheide (2007). I generate 1; 000; 000 draws from the posteriors. The
posterior medians and 90% credible sets are shown in Table 2.3.
The coe¢ cient (1  ) controls the degree of strategic complementarity in
price-setting. As shown in section 2.1.9, this coe¢ cient is very important, since
it a¤ects the persistence of the impulse response functions (IRFs) of output and
price level to shocks. The prior median of strategic complementarity (1  )
was set at 0. Bayesian updating points toward more strategic complementarity
in price-setting. This amplies the persistence in the mechanism of shock prop-
agation for any nite values of the signal-to-noise ratios. Figure 2-1 compares
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Table 2.3: Posterior Distributions
ICKM Calvo Model
Name Median 90% Interval Median 90% Interval
m 0:34 [0:24; 0:45] 0:24 [0:15; 0:33]
100A0 0:45 [0:36; 0:55] 0:43 [0:11; 0:74]
100M0 1:34 [1:18; 1:49] 1:34 [1:20; 1:48]
 0:32 [0:13; 0:50] 1:00 [0:00; 0:00]
100m 0:88 [0:81; 0:95] 0:89 [0:82; 0:97]
100a 0:88 [0:70; 1:04] 2:66 [2:04; 3:36]
100~m 9:04 [4:97; 12:77]    
100~a 1:36 [0:69; 2:02]    
pc     0:01 [0:01; 0:02]
     0:99 [0:99; 0:99]
1   0:69 [0:50; 0:87]    
m=~m 0:10 [0:06; 0:14]    
a=~a 0:66 [0:44; 0:94]    
the prior and the posterior distributions11 for the strategic complementarity
(1  ).
It is apparent that the Bayesian updating clearly pushes the strategic com-
plementarity toward a larger value than what is conjectured in the prior. The
posterior median of  is 0:32. This estimate is plausible. This number is con-
sistent with a Frisch labor-supply elasticity, , of 0:5 (Ríos-Rull et al., 2009), a
technology parameter, , of 0:65 (Cooley and Prescott, 1995), and a mark-up
of about 9:5% (Woodford, 2003 and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997).
Moreover, the posterior median of the signal-to-noise ratio regarding the
state of monetary policy, ~m=m, is large relative to that associated with the
state of technology, ~a=a. The signal-to-noise ratio concerning the state of
11They are non-parametric estimates of the prior and posterior distributions based on the
draws obtained from the simulator.
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Figure 2-1: Prior and Posterior Distribution for the Degree of Strategic Com-
plementarities
monetary policy is smaller by a factor of six.
As far as the Calvo model is concerned, the posterior median of the slope
of the Phillips curve, pc is 0:012. The 90% posterior credible set ranges from
0:006 to 0:019. This number is in line with previous studies as surveyed by
Schorfheide (2008).
2.2.5 MDD-Based Comparisons
The essay addresses the question of whether the ICKM provides an accurate
description of the propagation mechanism of monetary shocks to output and
ination. To do that, I estimate a largely parameterized VAR model and obtain
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its IRFs of output and ination to monetary shocks. I then compare these IRFs
to those of the estimated ICKM. In this comparison, the VAR IRFs work as a
benchmark. From a Bayesian perspective, this comparison is sensible as long
as the VAR model attains a higher posterior probability than the ICKM, as
pointed out in Schorfheide (2000). In this section, I verify that this is indeed
true by comparing the marginal data densities (MDDs) of the ICKM and the
VAR (Kass and Raftery, 1995, Schorfheide 2000, and An and Schorfheide, 2007).
Let me denote the ICKM asMI and the data used for estimation as ~Y . The
MDD of the ICKM, P

~Y jMI

, is:
P

~Y jMI

=
Z
L

I j ~Y ;MI

p (I jMI) dI
where L () stands for the likelihood function, and p (j) denotes the posterior
distribution, and I is the parameter set of the ICKM, as dened in 2.2.3. I use
Gewekes harmonic mean estimator (Geweke, 1999) to approximate the MDDs
of the ICKM.
I consider a VAR(4):
~Yt = 0 +1 ~Yt 1 +2 ~Yt 2 +3 ~Yt 3 +4 ~Yt 4 + t (2.27)
where ~Yt = [lnYt; lnPt]
0 and   E (t0t). I t this VAR(4) to the data set
presented in section 2.2.1. The Minnesota random walk prior (Doan, Litter-
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man, and Sims, 1984) is implemented in order to obtain a prior distribution
for the VAR parameters. Moreover, I obtain 100; 000 posterior draws through
Gibbs sampling. To compute the MDD of the VAR model, I apply the method
introduced by Chib (1995).
The log of the MDDs of the VAR and that of the ICKM are reported in
Table 2.4. The VAR outperforms the ICKM in tting the data. This result
is not surprising, since the ICKM is very stylized compared to this statistical
model. From a Bayesian perspective, this result legitimates the use of the VAR
IRFs as a benchmark for studying whether the estimated ICKM can accurately
explain the propagation of monetary shocks.
Table 2.4: Logarithms of Marginal Datat Densities (MDDs)
Models
ICKM Calvo VAR(4)
log MDD 1548:70 1529:38 1727:04
Moreover, I also compute the MDD of the Calvo model and report the re-
sult in Table 2.4. The ICKM has a larger MDD than the Calvo model. This
implies that the ICKM ts the data better than the Calvo model. From this
result, it follows that the ICKM is better than the Calvo model in approximat-
ing the true probability distribution of the data generating process under the
Kullback-Leibler distance (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2004). It
is important to emphasize that the fact that the Calvo model has one parameter
less than the ICKM is not problematic, since MDD-based comparisons penalize
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models for their number of parameters.
2.2.6 IRF-Based Comparisons
In order to identify the monetary shock in the VAR, I use the restriction that
monetary policy has no long-run real e¤ects (e.g., Blanchard and Quah, 1989).
Note that this identication scheme is consistent with both the ICKM and the
Calvo model.
The IRFs of real output and ination to a monetary shock implied by the
VAR, the ICKM, and the Calvo model are plotted in Figures 2-2 and 2-3,
respectively. The size of the shock is normalized so that the reaction of variables
upon impact is the same in all models. As also found by other studies (e.g.,
Christiano et al., 2005), the VAR-based IRFs document highly persistent and
hump-shaped e¤ects of monetary disturbances upon output and ination.
The Calvo model does not seem to be well-suited to accounting for the
hump-shaped pattern of the VAR response, whereas the ICKM appears to be
successful in this respect. Moreover, it is worthwhile noticing that the IRF of
real output implied by the ICKM peaks three quarters after the occurrence of
the shock, exactly as suggested by the benchmark VAR. On the contrary, the
Calvo model predicts that the largest response of real output arises two quarters
after the occurrence of the shock.
Furthermore, the VAR IRF emphasizes the presence of delayed e¤ects of
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Figure 2-2: Impulse Response Function MP => Real GDP
monetary shocks on ination, which do not seem to be quite captured by the
two DSGE models. The IRF of ination implied by the VAR reaches its peak
after four quarters, while, according to the ICKM, this happens after three
quarters.
The estimated ICKM - albeit very stylized - successfully captures the per-
sistent and hump-shaped response of output and ination to monetary shocks
implied by the broadly parameterized VAR. This leads me to conclude that the
estimated ICKM provides an accurate description of the propagation mechanism
of monetary shocks.
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Figure 2-3: Impulse Response Function MP => Ination
2.3 Concluding Remarks
I develop a DSGE model with imperfect common knowledge in the sense of
Woodford (2002). The model features two aggregate shocks: a monetary pol-
icy shock and a technology shock. I obtain Bayesian estimates for the model
parameters. I nd that even though the model is very stylized, its impulse re-
sponse functions of real output and ination to a monetary policy shock closely
match those implied by a largely parameterized VAR. Quite remarkably for
such a stylized model, output and ination react in a hump-shaped and persis-
tent fashion to monetary shocks, as is widely documented by other inuential
empirical studies (e.g., Christiano et al., 1999). Nonetheless, the estimated
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signal-to-noise ratio concerning monetary policy is smaller than that of technol-
ogy by a factor of six. This implies that rms have far less information about
the state of monetary policy. This begs the question of whether such a nding
is plausible or not. In the next chapter, I will shed some light on this issue.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Allocation of Attention
In the rst chapter, I show that a DSGE model with information frictions á
la Woodford (2002) can account for the highly persistent e¤ects of monetary
disturbances that are observed in the data. Nonetheless, the estimated signal-
to-noise ratio about monetary policy turns out to be smaller than that about
technology by a factor of six. The signal-to-noise ratio determines the accu-
racy of a signal and, hence, how much information the signal conveys to those
who receive it. Thus, this nding raises a question: is it plausible that rms
acquire so little information about monetary policy? The answer to this ques-
tion is no. I reach this conclusion by augmenting the model so as to allow
rms to optimally choose the signal-to-noise ratios, subject to a constraint that
sets an upper-bound to the overall precision of the signals. This constraint is
widely used in the literature of rational inattention and is termed information-
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processing constraint (Sims, 2003 and Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). It
species the rate at which rms can substitute pieces of information between
the two shocks of the model (i.e., monetary policy shock and technology shock).
Hence, the information-processing constraint denes a schedule along which
rms can choose the optimal signal to noise ratios. I will call this augmented
ICKM rational inattention model.
I nd that the rmsmarginal value of the information about monetary
shocks is much higher than that about technology shocks in the model I es-
timated in the previous chapter. Furthermore, when I solve for the optimal
signal-to-noise ratios, rms nd it optimal to acquire more information about
monetary shocks than about technology shocks. These results admit two al-
ternative interpretations. First, the signal-to-noise ratio relative to monetary
policy seems to be implausibly small in the estimated ICKM. Second, the likeli-
hood suggests that the rate at which rms are allowed to substitute information
between the two shocks in rational inattention models may be wrong.
In the rst section, I discuss how to construct the signal-to-noise schedule
that is consistent with the information-processing constraint used in the litera-
ture of rational inattention. In the second section, rmsproblem of allocating
their attention is presented. In the third section, I compare the marginal rates
of prot in the estimated ICKM. and in the rational inattention model. Finally,
I show the results of some robustness check.
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3.1 Signal-to-Noise Schedule
Rational-inattention models rely on an information-theoretic measure to quan-
tify the amount of processed information, as proposed by Sims (2003). This
measure quanties the reduction of uncertainty that occurs after having ob-
served the last realization of signals. More formally,
  H  mt; atjzt 1m;i ; zt 1a;i  H  mt; atjztm;i; zta;i (3.1)
where H () denotes the conditional entropy, which measures the uncertainty
about a random variable, and the history of the two signals observed by rm i
at time t is denoted by ztm;i and z
t
a;i. The conditional entropy is dened as
H
 
mt; atjzm;i; za;i

=
Z Z
log2

p
 
mtatjzm;i; za;i

p
 
mtatjzm;i; za;i

dmtdat
where p
 
mtjz1;i

is the conditional probability density function of mt.
Since signals and exogenous states are orthogonal, one can show that equa-
tion (3.1) can be re-written as
 = m + a (3.2)
where m and a stand for the information ows regarding monetary policy and
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technology, respectively, and are dened as:
m  H
 
mtjzt 1m;i
 H  mtjztm;i
a  H
 
atjzt 1a;i
 H  atjzta;i
Here, the unit of measurement of the information ows , m, a is the bit.
To dene the signal-to-noise schedule, let me introduce the mappings gm and
ga that link the signal-to-noise ratios and the information ows as follows:
m = gm (m; ~m;) ; a = ga (a; ~a) (3.3)
where  is a vector of autocorrelations of mt. The mapping ga can be analyti-
cally derived, while the mapping gm can be computationally approximated. See
Appendix C.
For any given , m, a, and , the signal-to-noise schedule is dened by
equations (3.2) and (3.3). In other words, the signal-to-noise schedule is dened
as a set of pairs of signal-to-noise ratios (m=~m; a=~a) that imply the same
overall amount of processed information, .
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3.2 The Optimal Allocation of Attention
In period zero,1 rms allocate their available attention2 by solving:
max
m;a
E
" 1X
t=1
t^t
 
p^i;t; p^t; y^t; q^t
 jz0i
#
; (3.4)
st
lnP i;t  E

(1  ) lnPt + mt   atjzti

(3.5)
zi;t =
2664 mt
at
3775+
2664 ~m 0
0 ~a
3775 ei;t (3.6)
~m = g
 1
m (m; m; m) ; ~a = g
 1
a (a; a) (3.7)
m + a = ; any t (3.8)
where ^t () is the log-quadratic approximation of Qtt, where t is the period
prot function (2.11), p^i;t = ln
 
P i;t=Pt

, q^t is the log deviations of qt = MtQt
from its value at the deterministic steady state, and ei;t
iidv N (0; I2). The
1Firms are not allowed to reconsider the allocation of attention in any period after t = 0.
Since rmsperiod prot function is quadratic and all shocks are Gaussian, it can be shown
that this assumption does not give rise to a problem of time inconsistency of rmspolicies.
See Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
2Since [1] the period prot function is quadratic, [2] all shocks are Gaussian and [3] rms
are assumed to have received an innite sequence of signals at time t = 0, the objective
function of the allocation-of-attention problem can be shown to be the same across rms. See
Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009). Thus, every rm will nd it optimal to choose the same
allocation of attention, (m; a). These three conditions are also su¢ cient to obtain that the
information ows, m and a, do not vary over time in the information-processing constraint
(3.8).
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model economy is assumed to be at its deterministic steady state in period 0.
Moreover, I assume that rms have received an innite sequence of signals at
time 0. Note also that the mappings g 1m () and g 1a () in equation (3.7) are the
inverse of the functions (3.3). The constraint (3.8) is the information-processing
constraint and sets an upper-bound to the overall amount of information rms
can process in every period t.
In this problem, rms decide how to allocate their overall available attention,
which is quantied by the parameter , between observing monetary policy and
technology. Solving the allocation-of-attention problem (3.4)-(3.8) delivers the
optimal allocation of attention (m; 

a). Note that when rms decide how to
allocate their attention, they are aware that their choice will a¤ect their optimal
price-setting policy (3.5) in any subsequent periods.
3.3 Marginal Rate of Prot
The marginal rate of prot is dened as:
mrp  @=@m
@=@a
where  is the sum of discounted prots:
  E
" 1X
t=1
t^t
 
p^i;t; p^t; y^t; q^t
 jz0i
#
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It is very simple to see that the mrp at the optimal allocation of attention
(m; 

a) is equal to unity. Interestingly, enough, this result does not require to
set the parameter values in the rational inattention model. In the estimated
ICKM, however, mrp may be di¤erent from one. The reason is that the esti-
mated allocation of attention (m; a) may di¤er from the optimal one (m; 

a).
In fact, when one calibrates the parameters of the ICKM by using the poste-
rior medians, one nds that the mrp in the ICKM is 47:19. This number is
hugely bigger than unity. In the estimated ICKM, rms are willing to trade
more than 47 bits of information about technology to get one bit of information
about monetary policy. This number is too big to reconcile itself to the rational-
inattention theory. This result leads me to conclude that the estimated ICKM
implies that rms acquire implausibly too little information about monetary
policy.
It is worthwhile noticing that the nding above is a¤ected by the value of the
rate of substitution embedded into the information-processing constraint (3.8).
The signal-to-noise ratio picked by the likelihood would be consistent with an
information-processing constraint of the following type:
m +
1
47:19
a =  (3.9)
Therefore, one could also interpret the nding above as evidence that the rate
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of substitution implied by the information-processing constraint (3.8) is incon-
sistent with the data.
3.4 A Robustness Check
By using tools provided by the rational-inattention theory, I nd that rms
acquire implausibly little information about monetary policy. Now the question
is: does the ICKM model really need to make such an implausible prediction to
match the persistent adjustment of variables to monetary shocks? To answer
this question, I compare the impulse response functions of output and ination
to monetary shocks at the optimal allocation of attention, (m; 

a), and at the
estimated allocation of attention, (m; a). The goal is to assess to what extent
the persistence of output and ination falls if rms are allowed to optimally
choose their allocation of attention as modelled in the problem (3.4)-(3.8).
I will rst compute the estimated information ows, (m; a), and the es-
timated overall amount of information processed, , in the ICKM. Given the
mappings in (3.3) and the prior (posterior) draws for the parameter of the
ICKM, I , I approximate the moments of the prior (posterior) distribution for
the information ows m and a through standard Monte Carlo methods. Table
3.1 shows the prior and posterior medians for those parameters and their 90%
credible intervals in the estimated ICKM. The posterior medians of m and a
are 0:10 bits and 0:41 bits, respectively. The posterior median of the overall
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amount of information processed by rms per quarter, , is 0:51 bits.3 Figure
3-1 compares the prior and the posterior distributions4 of the fraction of the
overall rmsattention paid to the technology shocks, that is, a= (m + a).
Figure 3-1: Prior and Posterior Distribution for the Allocation of Attention to
Technology
This graphical comparison emphasizes that, starting from a very agnostic
prior for the allocation of attention, the posterior distribution attributes a large
portion of rmsattention to technology (the posterior median is about 80%).
Hence, according to the data, the adjustment of output and ination to mon-
etary shocks is rather slow, as conrmed by the IRFs in Figures 2-2 and 2-3.
3This is obtained by using the prior and posterior draws for m and a as long as equation
(3.2).
4They are non-parametric estimates of the prior and posterior distributions based on the
draws obtained from the simulator.
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Furthermore, in Figure 3-1 the posterior appears to be far tighter than the prior,
suggesting that the data are quite informative about the proportion of overall
attention paid to technology: a= (m + a).
Table 3.1: Implied Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior
Variables Descriptions Median 90% Interval
m information ow MP 0:54 [0:08; 1:87]
a information ow tech. 0:66 [0:12; 1:21]
 = m + a overall level of attention 1:31 [0:40; 2:72]
a
m+a
allocation of attention to tech. 0:53 [0:15; 0:83]
Posterior
Variables Descriptions Median 90% Interval
m information ow MP 0:10 [0:06; 0:15]
a information ow tech. 0:41 [0:26; 0:60]
 = m + a overall level of attention 0:51 [0:34; 0:75]
a
m+a
allocation of attention to tech. 0:80 [0:74; 0:86]
Now I have to solve the problem (3.4)-(3.8) for the optimal allocation of
attention (m; 

a). Yet, I need rst to pin down the information-processing
constraint (3.8). To do that, I need to x one degree of freedom: the size of
the parameter . I calibrate the value of this parameter by using its estimated
value in Table 3.1, that is  = 0:51 bits. I then solve5 the problem (3.4)-
(3.8) for the optimal allocation of attention and obtain that m is equal to 0:33
5The optimal allocation of attention can be computed in four steps. First, I guess the values
of the information ows m and a and use the mappings in (3.7) to obtain the implied noise
variances, ~m and ~a. Second, given this guess, I numerically characterize the law of motion
of the price level exactly as I do when solving the ICKM (see section 2.9). Third, I numerically
solve the problem (3.4)-(3.8) to obtain the optimal allocation of attention, km and 

a. Fourth,
I check whether k !   ! k < ", for vectors  !  (m; a)0 and  !   (m; a)0, with " > 0
and small. If this criterion is not satised, I do another loop by setting the guess  ! =  ! .
Otherwise, stop.
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and a is equal to 0:22. These ndings show that the estimated allocation of
attention (m; a) (see Table 3.1) is very di¤erent from the optimal one (m; 

a).
The optimal allocation of attention implies that rms pay more attention to
monetary policy than to technology.
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 show the IRFs of output and ination to a monetary
shock implied by the ICKM at the estimated allocation of attention (EAA) and
at the optimal allocation of attention (OAA). These gures also show the same
IRFs implied by the benchmark VAR, analyzed in section 2.2.6. Output and
ination adjust very fast to monetary policy shocks at the optimal allocation of
attention. This is not consistent with what is documented by the VAR. Hence,
I conclude that the ICKM requires that rms acquire implausibly little infor-
mation about monetary policy in order to generate the persistent propagation
of monetary disturbances that is found in the data.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argue that the estimated model predicts that rms acquire
little information about monetary policy shocks to an extent that is not plau-
sible. I draw this conclusion from evaluating a simplied rational-inattention
model à la Sims (2003). This model is an imperfect-common-knowledge model
in which rms are allowed to choose the optimal information ows about the
two shocks along a schedule that is commonly used in the literature of ratio-
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IRF: Money shock => Real output
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Figure 3-2: IRF: Money shock => Real Output
nal inattention. I show that the marginal value of information about monetary
policy is much higher than that about technology at the point on the schedule
predicted by the estimated imperfect-common-knowledge model. Furthermore,
I nd that the imperfect-common-knowledge model requires that rms acquire
implausibly little information about monetary policy to generate the persistent
propagation of monetary disturbances observed in the data. This result calls for
further research on the substitution rate of information that rms actually face
when they allocate their attention. For instance, nding evidence that can help
quantifying the relative di¢ culty of learning about di¤erent shocks for rms
would be very useful.
Other leading studies based upon rational inattention models (e.g., Ma´ckowiak
and Wiederholt 2009 ) put restrictions upon the choice set of signal processes so
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IRF: Money shock => Inflation
(deviations from balanced-growth path in units of percentage points at a quarterly rate)
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Figure 3-3: IRF: Money shock => Ination
that the optimal signals are Gaussian and orthogonal to each others. This re-
striction leads to a rate of substitution that is equal to one. This study suggests
that this rate may not be sensible from an empirical perspective.
Finally, it is worthy noticing that in full-edge rational inattention mod-
els (e.g., Sims, 2003, 2006) agents choose the stochastic process of the signal
under no parametric restrictions. In such models, optimal signals might not
be orthogonal and Gaussian. Hence, the rate of substitution is not said to be
equal to one and depends on the nature of the optimal signal. While this may be
seen as a possible resolution of the discrepancy between the likelihood estimates
and model predictions, this approach has the shortcoming of complicating the
economic interpretation of the implied rate of substitution.
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Chapter 4
Monetary Policy and Beliefs
That monetary policy inuences output and ination by a¤ecting agentsex-
pectations has come to a growing consensus among scholars and policy makers
(Woodford, 2005, Morris and Shin, 2007). Michael Woodford writes:
Central banking is not like steering an oil tanker, or even guiding a space-
craft, which follows a trajectory that depends on constantly changing factors, but
that does not depend on the vehicles own expectations about where it is head-
ing. Because the key decisionmakers in an economy are forward-looking, central
banks a¤ect the economy as much through their inuence on expectations as
through any direct, mechanical e¤ects of central bank trading in the market for
overnight cash.
The aim of this chapter is to quantitatively assess the relevance of this new
transmission channel of monetary policy that relies on a¤ecting agentsbeliefs.
I develop a DSGE model where agents take decisions under incomplete and
disperse information about aggregate state variables or fundamentals (e.g., in-
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ation and output). The model economy is populated by six classes of agents:
households, intermediate goods rms, nal goods producers, a monetary author-
ity (or central bank) and a government. There are three aggregate shocks: a
technology shock, a monetary-policy shock, and a government spending-shocks.
The monetary authority perfectly observes the history of aggregate shocks and
sets its monetary policy instrument (i.e., interest rate) by following a Taylor-
type reaction function. For tractability, I shall assume that households, nal
goods producers, and government have perfect information. Each intermediate
goods rm lives on an island. No information can be traded among islands.
Firms face nominal rigidities á la Calvo: there exists a lottery that establishes
which rms are allowed to re-optimize their prices. Those rms that are allowed
to re-optimize their prices have to forecast the dynamics of future marginal costs
that depend on output gap and ination. They perform this forecast by observ-
ing last periods output and ination, the current island-specic technology
shock, and the current interest rate set by the central bank.
Firms observe the history of island-specic technology shocks but they do
not observe any of the aggregate shocks. The island-specic technology shock
is correlated with the aggregate technology shock. Hence, the island-specic
technology shocks are private signals that convey information about the current
aggregate technology. As a result of the idiosyncratic nature of these signals,
rmsexpectations about ination and output di¤er across islands.
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Firms also know the monetary policy reaction function and perfectly observe
the interest rate set by the monetary authority in every period. The salient
feature of this model is that the monetary authority holds superior information
about the aggregate shocks than rms. In such a setup, the monetary policy
instrument works as a public signal that conveys novel information to rms
about the aggregate shocks and can inuence output and ination by a¤ecting
rmsexpectations.
An appealing feature of the model is that strategic complementarities in
price settings and disperse information lead to the inertial behavior of ination.
In the model, rms face strategic complementarities in price-setting: they nd it
optimal to raise (cut) their prices when the average price increases (decreases).
Private information is introduced into the price setting problem of the rm
through the island-specic technology shocks that work as private signals. The
optimal price of an individual good depends positively on a rms own marginal
cost and the price chosen by other rms, but individual rms cannot observe the
marginal cost of other rms and therefore do not know the current price chosen
by other rms with certainty. This set up may be referred to as rms having
imperfect common knowledge. As shown in chapter 1, in such an environment, a
forecasting-the-forecasts-of-others type of problem arises and generates sluggish
responses of output and ination to nominal disturbances.
Furthermore, the model can be shown to be nested within a standard New
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Keynesian DSGE model where rms are perfectly informed. If one assumes
that rmsinformation sets are complete (i.e., rms also observe current output
and ination), the dispersed information model boils down to a prototypical
three-equation New Keynesian DSGE model, where monetary disturbances af-
fect output by inuencing the intertemporal allocation of consumption. This
traditional transmission channel of monetary policy still exists in the dispersed
information model. Yet, in the dispersed information model, there is another
transmission channel through which monetary impulses a¤ect model variables.
This channel relies on the role of interest rate as a public signal. More precisely,
changes in the interest rate are interpreted by rms as realizations of a public
signal that provides unanticipated information on the dynamic of marginal costs.
Quite importantly, the nestedness of the dispersed information model within a
standard New Keynesian DSGE model allows me to assess the signicance of
this new transmission channel by running simple counterfactuals.
4.1 A Brief Overview of the Literature
From a theoretical perspective, the idea that publicly observed policy can coor-
dinate agentsexpectations has been recently explored by the literature of global
games (Morris and Shin, 2003a). Morris and Shin (2003b) and Amato and Shin
(2003, 2006) derive normative implications for incomplete-information settings
and focus on the welfare e¤ects of disclosing public information. Hellwig (2002)
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derives impulse responses to a large range of shocks for an economy with mo-
nopolistic competition and incomplete information. These partial equilibrium
models, however, are too stylized to be used for empirically assessing central
banksrole for coordinating expectations.
My model is built on Nimark (2008) who introduces a model where rms
hold private information about the dynamics of their future marginal costs, and
face both strategic complementarities in price setting and nominal rigidities.
The nice feature of this model is that the supply side of this economy can be
analytically worked out and turns out to be characterized by an equation that
resembles the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve. One shortcoming of this
model is that the monetary policy framework is too stylized to have a chance to
capture the complexity of modern monetary policy practices. Furthermore, the
role of monetary policy in coordinating agentsexpectations is completely absent
in that central banks actions only convey redundant information to agents.
The model that is presented in this chapter is also related to Lorenzoni
(forthcoming), who studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate
uctuations are driven by the private sectors uncertainty about the economys
fundamentals. Information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents
and there are two aggregate shocks: a standard productivity shock and a noise
shock a¤ecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity. The nature of the
latter shock is related to public news about technological advances, aggregate
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statistics, and information reected in stock market prices and other nancial
variables. The central bank does not perfectly observe the noise shocks. The
central question addressed by Lorenzoni (forthcoming) is whether the monetary
policy should accommodate those noise shocks that work as a coordination
device of agentsexpectations.
4.2 The Model
There is a continuum of islands, indexed by j 2 (0; 1). In every island a con-
tinuum of households, indexed by i 2 (0; 1), lives along with one intermediate
goods rm. There is a centralized entity that conducts monetary policy: the
central bank. Another centralized entity, the government, carries out the scal
policy. Perfectly competitive nal goods producers also populate the economy.
Households consume the nal good and supply labor to the rm located in the
same island. It is assumed that households cannot ship their labor services to
rms that are located in other islands. A Calvo lottery establishes which islands
are allowed to re-optimize their prices. The outcome of the Calvo lotteries is
common knowledge among agents.
There are aggregate shocks and island specic shocks that hit the model
economy. The aggregate shocks are: a technology shock, a monetary-policy
shock, and a government-spending shock. The aggregate shocks can be decom-
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posed into a persistent and white noise component1. Every of these shocks is
orthogonal to others at all leads and lags. Island-specic shocks include the
island-specic technology, Aj;t, that determines the level of technology in the
island j at time t, and the outcome of the Calvo lottery for price-optimization.
The former shock is correlated with the aggregate technology shock. Both
island-specic shocks are orthogonal to each other at all leads and lags.
Any period t is divided into three stages. At stage 0 (t; 0), the market for
state-contingent claims opens and closes. At stage 1 (t; 1), island-specic shocks
realize, households and rms observe island-specic shocks, and rms set their
prices. At stage 2 (t; 2), state-contingent claims are settled and households learn
the state of the economy. At this stage, households choose consumption, money
holdings, bonds and their labor supplies. The scal authority decides how much
to consume. Final goods producers demand intermediate goods across islands
and use them as inputs to produce the nal good to be sold to the households
and to the government. Intermediate goods rms hire labor and produce so as
to deliver the demanded quantity of their good at the price they set.
The market for state-contingent claims has three important features: rst,
households can trade in this market only at the stage 0. Second, the claims
traded in the market pay out the numeraire at the stage 2. Hence, these claims
can be made contingent to the observed states at the stage 2. Third, rms are
1Monetary shocks are decomposed into an ination-targeting shock and a white noise shock
to the Taylor rule.
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not allowed to trade these claims.
The market for state-contingent claims ensures that the wealth distribution
across islands is degenerate. Furthermore, this market also plays an informative
role in the model, since households learn the state of the economy when they
get the proceeds from their investments in this market at the stage 2. Since
households are not heterogenous in their information sets at the stage 2 and
wealth is the same across islands, then one can use the representative household
to solve the problem of households.
4.2.1 Technology and Intermediate Goods Firms
Consider an arbitrary island j. In this island, the rm j produces according to
a linear technology:
Yj;t = Aj;tNj;t (4.1)
We assume that labor markets are segmented across islands. The real marginal
costs for rm j are given by:
mcj;t =
Wj;t
Aj;tPt
whereWj;t is the competitive nominal wage in the island j and Pt is the price of
the nal good. Aj;t is the island-specic technology shock that can be decom-
posed into (1) a trend component A0, (2) a persistent aggregate component, zt,
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(3) a white-noise aggregate component, a;t, and (4) a white-noise idiosyncratic
component, aj;t. More specically, we have:
Aj;t = A
t
0Ate
aj;t (4.2)
with A0 > 1 , and aj;t
iidv N (0; ja), and
At = e
zt+aa;t (4.3)
where a;t
iidv N (0; 1) and
zt = zzt 1 + z"z;t
with "z;t
iidv N (0; 1).
Firms face a Calvo lottery with probability  of not adjusting their prices.
After having observed the outcome of the Calvo lottery, intermediate goods
rms set the prices in their islands and they commit to satisfy any demanded
quantity at that price. Those rms that are allowed to re-optimize their prices
solve:
max
P j;t
E
" 1X
s=0
()s j;t+s
 
sP

j;t  MCj;t+s

Yj;t+sjIj;t
#
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such that
Yj;t+s =

sP

j;t
Pt+s
 
Yt+s; Yj;t = Aj;tNj;t
Ij;t = fR ; P 1; Y 1;j; ; :   tg
j;t =

Aj;t; P

j;t; Yj;t 1;MCj;t 1; Nj;t 1;Wj;t 1;j;t 1
	
whereMCj;t is the nominal marginal cost. j;t stands for the stochastic discount
factor. The rms specic demand Yj;t is standard and can be easily derived
from nal goods producersproblem. Ij;t is the information set of rm j at time
t.
If one solves the problem of those rms that are allowed to re-optimize its
price, one obtains:
E
" 1X
s=0
()s j;t+s

(1  )s + 
MCj;t+s
P j;t

Yj;t+sjIj;t
#
= 0
The price index is given by
P 1 t =
Z
P 1 j;t dj
and hence,
P 1 t =  (Pt 1)
1  + (1  )
Z  
P j;t
1 
dj
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4.2.2 Preferences
Consumption Cj;t, labor Nj;t, and nancial decisions (money Mj;t, and bonds
Bj;t) are taken at the second stage. We assume that the habit stock is given by
the level of technology At. This assumption ensures that the economy evolves
along a balanced growth path even if the utility function is additively separable
in consumption, real money balances, and leisure. Households solve2:
max
Cj;t;Bj;t;Mj;t;Nj;t
(Cj;t=A
t
0)
1    1
1   +
m
1  m

Mj;t
Pt
1 m
  Nj;t
such that
PtCj;t+Bj;t+Mj;t = Wj;tNj;t+Rt 1Bj;t 1+Mj;t 1+j;t Tt+ qt (!j;t) dj;t (!j;t)
!j;t =

't; Aj;t; ICalvoj;t
	
where Rt is the interest rate paid out by the bond, j;t is the dividend paid by
the rm located in the island j, Tt is a lump-sum tax/transfer, and dj;t (!j;t)
is the amount of state-contingent claims that pay one unit of the numeraire
at stage (t,2) if the state !j;t realizes. Note that by observing the price of
these claims, qt, households learn the state variables !j;t. 't is a vector that
2Note that the utility function is linear in labor. Relaxing this restriction would make the
marginal costs in the island j to be di¤erent from the structure: MCj;t =MCt + "j;t, where
"j;t is a linear functions of island specic shocks. This property of the island-specic marginal
costs is necessary to derive the imperfect-information Phillips curve as in Nimark (2008).
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includes the decomposed fundamentals, that is the technology shock (zt; a;t),
monetary-policy shock (^tjt; r;t), government spending shocks (gt; g;t).
The consumption Euler equation can be written as:
(Ct=A
t
0)
 
Pt
=

A0
Et
  
Ct+1=A
t+1
0
 
Pt+1
!
Rt (4.4)
The demand for money is:
m
 
Mt
A
t=m
0 Pt
! m 
Ct
At0

=

Rt   1
Rt

(4.5)
The supply for labor becomes:


Ct
At0

=
Wt
At0Pt
(4.6)
4.2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary policy is modeled by specifying a Taylor-rule type reaction func-
tion:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r "t
t
  Yt
Y t
y#(1 r)
err;t (4.7)
where r;t
iidv N (0; 1). The monetary authority sets the interest rate Rt and
is perfectly informed (i.e., it observes the contemporaneous realizations of all
aggregate variables). t stands for the ination target that follows a stationary
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AR process:
ln t = (1  ) +  ln t 1 + ";t
where ";t
iidv N (0; 1). We nally dene output gap Y t  At0Aty where y is
the steady-state value of detrended output.
The government transfers resources to/from and issue bonds to households
at the stage 2. Furthermore, they decide their consumption of nal goods. The
government budget constraint is:
PtGt +Rt 1Bt 1  Bt +Mt 1  Mt = Tt
where government spending Gt is
Gt = (1  1=t)Yt
We can decompose the government spending shock t into:
t = gte
gg;t
where "g;t v N (0; 1) and
ln gt =
 
1  g

ln g0 + g ln gt 1 + ~g"g;t
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where g;t v N (0; 1). We will denote ^t = ln (t=g0) and g^t = ln gt   ln g0.
The resource constraint can be shown to be:
Yt = tCt
4.2.4 Detrending
Let us denote the ination rate as t  Pt=Pt 1. Moreover, dene:
yt  Yt
At0
; ct  Ct
At0
; pj;t 
P j;t
Pt
; yj;t  Yj;t
At0
wj;t  Wj;t
At0Pt
; at  At
At0
; Rt  Rt
R
; mcj;t  MCj;t
Pt
j;t  At0j;t
The Euler equation (4.4) becomes:
c t =

A0
Et

c t+1
t+1

Rt (4.8)
The price setting equation becomes:
E

t

(1  ) + mcj;t
pj;t

yj;tjIj;t

+ (4.9)
E
" 1X
s=1
()s t+s

(1  )s + 
mcj;t+s
pj;t
(s=1t+ )

yj;t+sjIj;t
#
= 0
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The resource constraint becomes:
yt = tct (4.10)
4.2.5 Log-linearization
First, it is easy to show that the resource constraint (4.10) becomes:
y^t = ^t + c^t (4.11)
Note that the consumption Euler equation becomes:
 c^t =  Etc^t+1   Et^t + R^t
By substituting the resource constraint (4.11) we obtain the standard IS equa-
tion:
y^t   ^t = Et

y^t+1   ^t+1

+
1

Et^t   1

R^t (4.12)
The Phillips curve is worked out in the appendix D:
^t = (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k cmc(k)tjt +  1X
k=0
(1  )k b(k+1)t+1jt
where cmc(k)tjt denotes the average k-th order expectations about the real aggre-
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gate marginal costs, cmct. For any k 2 f1; 2; : : :g one can show that:
cmc(k)tjt =  y^(k+1)tjt   ^(k+1)tjt   z(k)tjt   a(k)a;tjt (4.13)
By using this result, we write:
^t = (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k
h


y^
(k+1)
tjt   ^
(k+1)
tjt

  z(k)tjt   a(k)a;tjt
i
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k b(k+1)t+1jt (4.14)
The Taylor rule can be easily linearized:
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r)

 (^t   ^t ) + y
 
y^t   zt   aa;t

+ rr;t (4.15)
where
^t = ^

t 1 + "

t
4.2.6 Perfect Information Model (PIM)
A nice feature of the model is that it nests standard three-equation New Key-
nesian DSGE model. If one assumes that rms perfectly observe current output
and ination: Ipj;t = fR ; P ; Y ;j; ; :   tg, then the model boils down to:
y^t   ^t = Et

y^t+1   ^t+1

+
1

Et^t   1

R^t (4.16)
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^t =
(1  ) (1  )

h


y^t   ^t

  zt   aa;t
i
+ Etbt+1 (4.17)
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r)

 (^t   ^t ) + y
 
y^t   zt   aa;t

+ rr;t (4.18)
4.3 Model Solution
The model is solved through a guess-and-verify strategy. Lets guess the law of
motion of the endogenous variables:
^t = a0'
(0:k)
tjt + a1R^t 1
y^t = b0'
(0:k)
tjt + b1R^t 1
R^t = c0'
(0:k)
tjt + c1R^t 1
where '(0:k)tjt is a column vector collecting the average expectations of the exoge-
nous variables up to the k-th order. More specically,
'
(0:k)
tjt 
h
z
(s)
t ; 
(s)
a;t ; ^
(s)
tjt ; 
(s)
r;t ; g
(s)
t ; 
(s)
g;t : s 2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg
i0
The vector st includes the endogenous state variables of the model:
st =
h
^t; y^t; R^t
i0
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I will also guess that the vector of higher-order beliefs, '(0:k)tjt , and the state
variables, st, follows a VAR(1). Thus, we conjecture that rms state-space
model is the following3:
A
266666666664
'
(0:k)
tjt
st
'
(0:k)
t 1jt 1
st 1
377777777775
| {z }
Xt
= B
266666666664
'
(0:k)
t 1jt 1
st 1
'
(0:k)
t 2jt 2
st 2
377777777775
| {z }
Xt 1
+C
26666666666666666664
"z;t
a;t
";t
r;t
"g;t
g;t
37777777777777777775
| {z }
"t
(4.19)
266666666664
lnAj;t   lnA0t
t 1   ln 
lnYt 1   ln y   lnA0t
R^t   ln R^
377777777775
=
266666666664
L 0 0 0
0 0 0 1T1
0 0 0 1T2
0 1T3 0 0
377777777775
| {z }
D
Xt +
266666666664
ja
0
0
0
377777777775
| {z }
Q
aj;t|{z}
ej;t
:
3Note that we do not need to include the past island-specic nominal marginal costs into
the set of observables as they are just a linear combination of known variables, that is the
island-specic nominal wage and island-specic shock. Indeed,
lnMCj;t   lnA0  t = lnWj;t zt   aa;t   aj;t| {z }
lnAj;t
The same is true for the output sold by rm j, which is a linear combination of aggregate
output and price level.
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where 1Ti is a row vector with the i-th element equal to one and zero elsewhere,
and
A=
266666666664
I 0 0 0
 v0 I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I
377777777775
; B =
266666666664
M 0 0 0
0 v2 0 0
I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
377777777775
; C =
266666666664
N
0
0
0
377777777775
where I is the identity matrix, L =

1; 1; 016k+4

, v0 = [a00;b
0
0; c
0
0]
0, and
v2 = [032;v1] ,
with v1 = [a1; b1; c1]
0.
The full characterization of the matrices M and N is obtained through
repeated applications of the Kalman lter and is detailed in appendix F. The
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rst six rows of the matricesM and N are known:
M(1:6;:) =
26666666666666666664
z 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 g 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37777777777777777775
; N(1:6;:)=
26666666666666666664
z 0 0 0 0 0
0 a 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0
0 0 0 r 0 0
0 0 0 0 ~g 0
0 0 0 0 0 g
37777777777777777775
Solving the model, hence, requires to computationally nd a xed point over
the space of vectors [v0;v1] and matrices [M;N]. We verify the guess by using
the the three structural equations of the model: the IS equation (4.12), the
Phillips curve (4.14) and the Taylor rule (4.15).
In appendix E, we show that the Euler equation (4.12) implies that:
b0 = 1
T
5 + 1
T
6 + b0M+b1c0  
 
1T5 + 1
T
6

M+
1

(a0M+a1c0)  1

c0
b1 = b1c1 +
1

a1c1   1

c1
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The Phillips curve (4.14) can be rewritten as (see appendix E):
a0 = (1  ) (1  ) 
"
m1  
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s  (s+1)0g + (s)0a 
!#
+ m2 + 
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T1 v11
T
3 v0
a1 = (1  ) (1  )
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T2 v1 + 
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T1 v11
T
3 v1
where
(s)g =

016s; (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1) ;016(k s)

(s)a =

016s; (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0) ;016(k s)
0
and
m1 
2666666666666664

1T2 v0
(1)T(1)

(1  ) 1T2 v0 (2)T(2)
(1  )2 1T2 v0 (3)T(3)
...
(1  )k 1 1T2 v0 (k)T(k)
3777777777777775
; m2 
2666666666666664
h
1T1 v0M
(1)T
(1)
i
(1  )
h
1T1 v0M
(2)T
(2)
i
(1  )2
h
1T1 v0M
(3)T
(3)
i
...
(1  )k 1
h
1T1 v0M
(k)T
(k)
i
3777777777777775
;
 = 11k
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The Taylor rule (4.15) imposes that (see appendix E)
c0 = (1  r)


 
a0   1T3

+ y
 
b0  
 
1T1 + 1
T
2

+ 1T4
c1 = r + (1  r)

a1 + yb1

As shown in appendix F, the matricesM and N are pinned down by the map-
pings:
M =
2664 R1
0
3775+
2664 066 066k
06k6 (I KD)Wj(1:6k;1:6k)
3775+
2664 0
KDWj(1:6k;1:6(k+1))
3775
N =
2664 R2
0
3775+
2664 0
KDUj(1:6k;1:6)
3775
where
R1 =
26666666666666666664
z 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 g 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37777777777777777775
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R2 =
26666666666666666664
z 0 0 0 0 0
0 a 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0
0 0 0 r 0 0
0 0 0 0 ~g 0
0 0 0 0 0 g
37777777777777777775
and K is the steady-state matrix of Kalman gains, which is well-known to be
equal to
K = PD0 [DPD0 +e]
 1 (4.20)
where e = QQ0. The variance and covariance matrix P solves the following
algebraic Riccati equation:
P =W
h
P PD0 [DPD0 +e] 1DP
i
W0 +UU0 (4.21)
and the matricesW and U are the reduced-form matrices of the system (4.19):
W = A 1B; U = A 1C.
4.3.1 Average Higher-Order Beliefs
Once one has solved the dispersed information model, the law of motion of the
average higher-order beliefs about the endogenous state variables, st, can be
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characterized. In appendix E. I show that for 0  s  k;
s
(s)
tjt 
26666664
^
(s)
tjt
y^
(s)
tjt
R^
(s)
tjt
37777775 = v0
(s)T(s)'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1 (4.22)
where T(s) =

06(k+1 s)6s; I6(k+1 s)

; and  (s) =

I6(k+1 s);06(k+1 s)6s
0
. The
average higher-order beliefs one-step-ahead beliefs follows:
s
(s)
t+1jt 
26666664
^
(s)
t+1jt
y^
(s)
t+1jt
R^
(s)
t+1jt
37777775 = v0M
(s)T
(s)
'
(0:k)
tjt + v11
T
3

v0'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1

(4.23)
4.4 Empirical Analysis
I t the model to observations of the growth rate of output, ination, and the
interest rate. I place a prior distribution on parameters and conduct Bayesian
inference. I solve the dispersed information model by truncating the higher
order beliefs at k = 10. I approximate the posterior distribution by means
of a random-walk Metropolis-Hastings method. In this section, I present the
data set, the measurement equations, the prior distributions and the posterior
distributions for model parameters. Finally, I will study the transmission of
monetary impulses to the macroeconomic aggregates implied by the estimated
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model.
4.4.1 The Data and the Measurement Equation
The data set ranges from the third quarter of 1954 to the fourth quarter of 2007.
Data are quarterly and are displayed in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Data
Observables Description Source
GDPt Gross Domestic Product BEA
POP16t Civilian nonistitutional population, 16 yrs and over BLS
CPIt Consumer Price Index-Averages of Monthly Figures BLS
FEDRATEt E¤ective Fed. Funds Rate-Averages of Daily Figures Board of Gov.
The measurement equations are:
ln

GDPt
POP16t

  ln
 
GDPt 1
POP16t 1
!
= 100 (y^t   y^t 1 + lnA0)
100 ln
CPIt
CPIt 1
= 100 (^t + ln)
100 ln(1 + FEDRATEt=100) = 100

4R^t + lnR

4.4.2 Priors
Solving the model takes 3-4 minutes for each parameter draw. So one might
not be able to generate a su¢ ciently large number of draws to accurately ap-
proximate the posterior moments. This concern is expected to be more severe
as the dimensionality of the parameter space is large. In order to address this
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concern, I restrict the value of seven out of the sixteen parameters of the model.
The parameters whose values are xed are listed in table 4.2
Table 4.2: Fixed Parameter Values
 y r z g   
1.5 0.125 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.9971 2
These parameter values are quite standard in the empirical literature on
DSGE models (An and Schorfheide, 2007 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). I set
the priors for the remaining parameters as displayed by the table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Priors
Name Range Density Median 90% Interval
 [0; 1) Beta 0:50 0:06  0:93
a R+ Inv.Wishart 0:50 0:06  4:00
z R+ Inv.Wishart 0:50 0:06  4:00
ja R+ Inv.Wishart 1:50 0:85  5:75
 R+ Inv.Wishart 0:06 0:02  0:12
r R+ Inv.Wishart 0:12 0:05  0:24
~g R+ Inv.Wishart 0:85 0:42  2:05
g R+ Inv.Wishart 1:00 0:49  2:41
The prior distributions are very di¤use as I do not hold precise information
about the decomposition of shocks. I aim at learning these parameter values
from the likelihood. The prior for the variance of the idiosyncratic technol-
ogy shock, ja is centered so as to make the perfect information model able to
replicate the average absolute size of price changes that is documented by the
literature on the microdata on price changes (Bils and Klenow, 2004).
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4.4.3 Posteriors
Given the priors and the likelihood function implied by the model, a closed-
form solution for the posterior distributions for parameters cannot be derived.
However, one can evaluate the posteriors numerically through the random-walk
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. How these procedures apply to macro DSGE
models is exhaustively documented by An and Schorfheide (2007). I generate
1; 500 draws from the posteriors. The posterior medians and 90% credible sets
are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Posteriors
Name Median 90% Interval
 0:88 0:86  0:89
a 0:28 0:22  0:32
z 0:35 0:27  0:42
ja 0:62 0:55  0:73
 0:02 0:02  0:03
r 0:02 0:02  0:03
g 0:22 0:18  0:25
~g 0:28 0:19  0:34
Figure 4-1 reports the recursive means of the posterior draws for the eight
parameters displayed in table 4.4.
The recursive means of the posterior draws for most of the parameters in
table 4.4 show that the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm converges. Slower con-
vergence is observed for ja and ~g.
The posterior median of the signal-to-noise ratio associated with the obser-
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Recursive Means
Figure 4-1: Recursive Means
vation equation (4.2) is 1:37. This quanties the amount of information rms
learn about the aggregate level of the technology, At, from observing their own
productivity shock.
4.4.4 Transmission of Monetary Disturbances
Figure 4-2 shows the responses of real GDP (deviations from the steady state
at a quarterly rate), ination (deviations from the steady state in percentage
points at a quarterly rate), and interest rate (percentage deviations from the
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steady state at a quarterly rate) to a one-standard deviation temporary mon-
etary policy shock
 
r;t

. Black squares denote the perfect information model,
while the solid lines refer to the dispersed information model. The impulse
response functions are computed at the posterior medians displayed in table
4.4.
Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 4-2: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock
The most striking nding is that monetary policy appears to have weaker
real e¤ects when rms are imperfectly informed. One can compute by how much
ination changes owing to a monetary policy shock that reduces output by 1%.
The imperfect information model predicts that a monetary policy shock that
reduces output by one percent causes ination to decrease by 1:01 percent. In
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the perfect information model, the ination reacts only by 0:10 percent. These
numbers show that prices are relatively less sticky in the imperfect informa-
tion model. Moreover, both these numbers are in line with the survey study
conducted by Schorfheide (2008). In the light of that study, the imperfect in-
formation model can be regarded as having similar degree of price rigidity as
that of the New Keynesian DSGE models with quite exible prices.
Why are the prices so exible in the imperfect information model? As stan-
dard in NewKeynesian models, ination depends on a current component (CCIt )
and a forward-looking component (FCIt ) in the dispersed information model.
For the imperfect information model, these two components are dened in equa-
tion (4.14). They are:
CCit = (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k cmc(k)tjt (4.24)
FCit = 
1X
k=0
(1  )k b(k+1)t+1jt (4.25)
with ^t = CCi+FCi. In the perfect information model, these two components
are dened in equation (4.17):
CCpt =
(1  ) (1  )

cmct (4.26)
FCpt = Etbt+1 (4.27)
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with ^t = CCp + FCp. Table 4.5 shows the value of these components at the
posterior medians for the two models.
Table 4.5: Ination Response Decomposition
Imperfect Information Model (IIM)
100 @^t
@r;t
100
@CCit
@r;t
100
@FCit
@r;t
Total  2:3546  0:5157  1:8389
In perc. 100:00% 21:90% 78:10%
Perfect Information Model (PIM)
100 @^t
@r;t
100
@CCpt
@r;t
100
@FCpt
@r;t
Total  0:3932  0:1303  0:2629
In perc. 100:00% 33:13% 66:87%
Excess Response of Ination in the IIM
100 @^t
@r;t
100

@CCit
@r;t
  @CCpt
@r;t

100

@FCit
@r;t
  @FCpt
@r;t

Total  1:9614  0:3854  1:5760
In perc. 100:00% 19:65% 80:35%
In both models, monetary disturbances inuence ination mainly through
ination expectations (i.e., the forward looking component). In the imperfect
information model, 78% of the ination adjustment upon the monetary shock
stems from the change in ination expectations. In the perfect information
model, this fraction is a bit smaller. In addition, in the imperfect information
model, the response of the forward-looking component to monetary shock is
about seven times bigger than that in the perfect information model. The
excess response of ination to a monetary shock in the imperfect information
model is -1.9614. The overreaction of the ination expectations in the imperfect
information model accounts for 80.35% for the excess responsiveness of the
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ination in the imperfect information model.
Why do ination expectations react so much in the imperfect information
model? Since the model nests the perfect information model, the excess re-
sponsiveness of ination in the imperfect information model comes from the
information frictions that alter the response of rms beliefs to shocks. In gure
4-3 I plot the impulse response functions of the average rst-order beliefs about
the exogenous variables to a temporary monetary shocks.
Impulse Response Functions of Higher-Order Beliefs
Figure 4-3: Impulse Response Functions of Higher-Order Beliefs
We observe that the average rst order expectations about the ination
target, t , and the persistent government spending shock, gt, are quite a¤ected
by the monetary policy shock. These beliefs deviate from the actual value
of the ination target and that of the persistent government-spending shock.
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Upon the monetary disturbance, these beliefs change roughly by about half
their conditional standard deviations, g and .
Which average beliefs are the culprits for the overreaction of the ination
expectations? We denote the contributions of the six classes of average higher-
order beliefs '(0:k)tjt to the response of ination expectations as

Cfz;t; C
f
a;t; C
f
;t; C
f
r;t; C
f
~g;t; C
f
g;t

:
Table 4.6 displays the result of this exercise:
Table 4.6: Decomposition of the Components CC and FC
Current Component CCdt
100
@CCit
@r;t
100
@Ccz;t
@r;t
100
@Cca;t
@r;t
100
@Cc
;t
@r;t
100
@Ccr;t
@r;t
100
@Cc~g;t
@r;t
100
@Ccg;t
@r;t
 0:5157  0:0689 0:0006  0:1791  0:0820  0:1803  0:0060
100:00% 13:36%  0:12% 34:73% 15:90% 34:97% 1:16%
Forward-Looking Component FCdt
100
@FCit
@r;t
100
@Cfz;t
@r;t
100
@Cfa;t
@r;t
100
@Cf
;t
@r;t
100
@Cfr;t
@r;t
100
@Cf~g;t
@r;t
100
@Cfg;t
@r;t
 1:8389  0:0056 0:0000  0:7708  0:2648  0:7979 0:0002
100:00% 0:30% 0:00% 41:92% 14:40% 43:39%  0:01%
The table also reports the contributions of the six classes of average higher-
order beliefs to the change in the current component, CCit
4. One can observe
4How does one quantify these components? Recall that the current component of ination,
CCit , depends on cmc(0:k)tjt , and some deep parameters. Yet the hierarchy of average higher-order
beliefs about real marginal costs, cmc(0:k)tjt , depend on the hierarchy of average higher-order
beliefs about real output by(0:k)tjt , and some exogenous variables: ^(k+1)tjt , z(k)tjt , and (k)a;tjt. See
(4.13) equation. Equation (4.22) pins down the response of the beliefs by(0:k)tjt . Equation (4.19)
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that the change in the forward-looking component is mainly due to the response
of average beliefs about the ination-target and the persistent government-
spending shock. The excess response of ination in the imperfect information
model (table 4.5) is almost entirely explained by the response these two average
beliefs.
The results in table 4.6 suggest that upon a temporary monetary shock,
r;t, rms are unsure about whether the change in the interest rate is due to
a an ination-targeting shock or a government-spending shock. This confusion
causes ination expectations to react very much to a monetary policy shock and
reduces the real e¤ects of money.
4.4.5 Costs of Disination
A fall in the ination target, t , is generally interpreted as a structural change in
policy aimed at reducing ination. Figure 4-4 shows the responses of real GDP
(deviations from the steady state at a quarterly rate), ination (deviations from
the steady state in percentage points at a quarterly rate), and interest rate
(percentage deviations from the steady state at a quarterly rate) to a structural
disination policy (";t) that reduces ination by 5% in the long run. Black
squares denote the perfect information model, while the solid lines refer to the
determines how the average beliefs ^
(k+1)
tjt , z
(k)
tjt , and 
(k)
a;tjt react to structural shocks. Equation
(4.23) sets the response of FCdt , which depends on b(0:k)tjt , to exogenous state variables, 't.
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dispersed information model. These impulse response functions are computed
at the posterior medians displayed in table 4.4.
Impulse Response Functions to an Ination-Targeting Shock
Figure 4-4: Impulse Response Functions to an Ination-Targeting Shock
Figure 4-4 shows that GDP falls more in the imperfect information model,
suggesting that costs of disination are larger. The cumulative e¤ect of the
policy upon real output is  56:54% for the imperfect information model, and
 8:34% for the perfect information model. This leads to conclude that the
imperfect information model predicts that the output loss associated to a dis-
ination policies is bigger than what is estimated by the perfect information
model.
The reasons for this nding can be understood by looking at the responses
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of the average expectations to a disination policy, which are shown in gure
4-5.
Impulse Response Functions of Higher-Order Beliefs
Figure 4-5: Impulse Response Functions of Higher-Order Beliefs
It is clear that when the central bank raises the interest rate to disinate
the economy, rms fail to interpret this as such. One can see this by observing
that the average expectations about t move very weakly upon a persistent
monetary policy shock. The plot also shows that rms learn extremely slowly
about the nature of the shock in the subsequent periods.
Table 4.7 plots the ination response decomposition upon the ination-
targeting shock.
Table 4.7: Ination Response Decomposition
In the perfect information model ination expectations react very strongly
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and fully anticipate the disination policy. This curbs the cost of disination.
Ination expectations react so strongly that the central bank has to cut the
interest rate to disinate (see gure 4-4). In the imperfect information model
ination expectations fail to anticipate the drop in ination and the central
bank has to forcefully raise the interest rate to disinate the economy. The last
row of table 4.7 shows that the lack of adjustment of ination expectations fully
account for the little response of ination in the imperfect information model.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter shows that modelling agentsexpectations may have a great deal
of implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. I obtain
two main results. First, the presence of imperfect information reduces the real
e¤ects of monetary policy. Second, the output loss associated with a monetary
policy of disination is larger when one considers imperfect information. Both
of these results arise because imperfectly informed rm cannot recognize the
exact nature of the shocks. More specically, upon a monetary policy shock
rms are not sure about whether the change in the interest rate is due to a
permanent monetary shock or a government-spending shock. This confusion
causes ination to react very much to a monetary policy shock and hence real
e¤ects of money are weak. After a disination policy, the ination expectations
fail to anticipate the e¤ects of the policy on prices. Hence, this policy turns out
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to be very costly in terms of output loss.
Future work requires further model validation. In particular, it is key to
assess the capability of the model to capture the dynamics of the rst moment
of the distribution of the survey of professional forecasters. From a Bayesian
perspective, this assessment can be done by using the date on expectations as
observables and run posterior predictive checks (An and Schorfheide, 2007).
The outcome of this check is by no means obvious. Del Negro and Eusepi
(2009) show that the imperfect information model in Erceg and Levin (2003)
does worse than a perfect information model in tting observed expectations.
It is important to emphasize that in the imperfect information model dif-
ferent monetary policy rules a¤ect the information content of the monetary
policy instrument and hence how monetary disturbances a¤ect macroeconomic
variables. A fascinating extension of this project would be characterizing the
optimal monetary policy in such a framework.
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Appendices
Appendix A Deriving the law of motion of price
and output in the ICKM
The rst-order necessary condition5 of the price-setting problem (2.11)-(2.16) in the
ICKM is:
Ei;t
"
Qt
 
Yi;t   P it

Pi;t
Pt
  1 Yt
Pt
+ 
Wt
At

Yi;t
At
 1Pi;t
Pt
  1 Yt
Pt
!#
= 0
From the solution to the representative households problem (2.2)-(2.5), the labor
supply can be easily shown to be Wt=Pt = YtH

t . Substituting this result and using
the equation (2.12) into the equation above yield:
Ei;t
24Qt
0@(1  )Pi;t
Pt
 
+


YtH

t
At
 
Pi;t
Pt
  Yt
At
! 1 1
Pi;t
Pt
  11AYt
35 = 0
Dene the stationary variables:
yt  Yt
At
; yi;t  Yi;t
At
; pi;t =
Pi;t
Pt
; ht = Ht (4.28)
With this notation, I can rewrite the price-setting equation as:
(1  )Ei;t

QtYtp
 
i;t

1 +  1yth

t

p i;t yt
 1 1
p 1i;t

= 0
It is easy to show that the expression within the round brackets is zero at the
deterministic symmetric steady-state. Hence, when one takes the log-linear approx-
imation of the equation above around the deterministic symmetric steady-state, one
does not need to care about what is outside those brackets. Hence the price-setting
5Note the slight change in notation from the main text. We denote E [jzti] = Ei;t.
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condition can be approximated as follows:
0 = Ei;t
h
h^t  


 
 1   1+ 1 p^i;t +  1y^ti
Note also that from the production function h^i;t =  1y^i;t and hence6 h^t =  1y^t.
By substituting, this results into the equation above, one obtains:
0 = Ei;t

( + 1) 1y^t  


 
 1   1+ 1 p^i;t
and then
Ei;tp^i;t =
( + 1) 1

 
 1   1+ 1Ei;ty^t
and more compactly, by dening   ( + 1) 1=    1   1+ 1,
Ei;t [p^i;t] = Ei;t [y^t]
In order to take rm is price Pi;t out of the expectation operator, I need to recall
the denition of the transformed variables in (4.28) and then write:
Ei;t
264lnPi;t   lnPt| {z }
p^i;t
375 = Ei;t
264lnYt   lnAt   ln y| {z }
y^t
375
or equivalently,
lnPi;t = Ei;t [ lnYt + lnPt    lnAt]   ln y
Recall equation (2.10):
lnPt + lnYt = lnMt ) lnYt = lnMt   lnPt
and thus,
lnPi;t = Ei;t [ (lnMt   lnPt) + lnPt    lnAt]   ln y
and by rearranging:
lnPi;t = Ei;t [(1  ) lnPt +  lnMt    lnAt]   ln y
This price-setting equation shows that the coe¢ cient 1    controls the strategic
complementarity in price-setting (i.e., the extent to which rms want to react to
the expected average price Ei;t (Pt)). In order to have strategic complementarities in
price-setting (i.e., rms want to raise (cut) their prices when the average price goes
up (down) ), one needs that   1.
If one log-linearizes equation (2.1) around the deterministic steady-state, one ob-
6Log-linearizing Yt =
R 1
0
(Yi;t)
 1
 di
 
 1
yields y^t =
R
y^i;tdi.
94
tains p^t =
R
p^i;tdi. Hence, by integrating across rms one obtains:
lnPt = (1  ) lnP (1)tjt +  lnM
(1)
tjt    lnA
(1)
tjt    ln y
From this equation, repeatedly taking the conditional expectation and averaging
across rms yield:
lnP
(j)
tjt = (1  ) lnP
(j+1)
tjt +  lnM
(j+1)
tjt    lnA
(j+1)
tjt    ln y
for j 2 f1; 2; : : :g. By repeatedly substituting these results into the average-price
equation one obtains:
lnPt =
1X
j=0
(1  )j  lnM (j+1)tjt   (1  )j  lnA
(j+1)
tjt   ln y
By recalling that I dened mt  lnMt  M0t and at  lnAt  A0t and that rms
know all the model parameters, I can re-write the equation above as:
lnPt =
24 1X
j=0
(1  )j 

m
(j+1)
tjt   a
(j+1)
tjt
35  ln y +M0t A0t
This is equation (2.20) in the main text. Furthermore, I can combine equations (2.20)
and (2.10) to get:
lnMt   lnYt| {z }
lnPt
=
24 1X
j=0
(1  )j 

m
(j+1)
tjt   a
(j+1)
tjt
35  ln y +M0t A0t
and by re-arranging, this yields:
lnYt =
24mt   1X
j=0
(1  )j m(j+1)tjt
35+ 1X
j=0
(1  )j a(j+1)tjt   ln y +A0t
which is the equation (2.21) in the main text.
Appendix B Solving the ICKM
In general, nding an equilibrium in models with incomplete informations requires
characterizing innitely many equilibrium laws of motion, which is absolutely unman-
ageable. In the present model, this issue can be elegantly resolved as in Woodford
(2002). More specically, I need only to keep track of a specic linear combination of
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average expectations, appearing in equations (2.20)-(2.21). Dene the vector Ft as
Ft 
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j)t (4.29)
where Xt  [mt;mt 1; at]0 (4.30)
Finding an equilibrium for the ICKM requires characterizing the equilibrium law of
motion of the nite-dimensional vector Ft. The transition equations of the ICKM
can be shown to be:
byt = bpt (4.31)bpt = r0Xt (4.32)
Xt = BXt 1 + but (4.33)
where
Xt 

X0t
... F0t
0
, r [ 1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1]0
B 

B3x3 03x3
G3x3 H3x3

; b =

b 0
... d0
0
(4.34)
B 
24 1 + m  m 01 0 0
0 0 1
35 ; b 
24 1 00 0
0 1
35 ; ut = ["m;t; "a;t]0
ut
iidv N (0;u) , for all t and u =

2m 0
0 2a

where G, H, and d are matrices that are not known yet. Equation (4.31) stems from
the log-linearized version of equation (2.10), where I dened the log-linear deviations
of the stationary output, yt, and price, pt, from their deterministic steady-state, as
y^t and p^t, respectively. Equation (4.32) can be derived by equation (2.20) by simply
adding lnAt   lnMt   ln p to both sides of this equation and by recalling that
p^t = lnPt + lnAt   lnMt   ln p
and
ln p+ ln y = 0;
because of equation (2.10).
Recall that the signal structure is specied in equations (2.16). Thus, the rms
observation equations are
zi;t = DXt + ei;t (4.35)
96
where
D 
h
D1
... 02x3
i
and D1 =

1 0 0
0 0 1

(4.36)
ei;t v N (0;e) ; iid for all t, and i; e =

~2m 0
0 ~2a

(4.37)
Finding an equilibrium for this economy amounts to characterize the unknown
matrices G, H, and d. This requires solving the following xed point problem. Given
the conjectured law of motion (4.33), optimal rmsbehaviors must exactly aggregate
to the conjectured law of motion (4.33). Like in Woodford (2002), the method of
undetermined coe¢ cients can be used to pin down those matrices.
It is easy to see that the rm is optimal estimate of the state vector evolves
according the so-termed kalman-lter equation
Xtjt (i) = Xtjt 1 (i) + k

zt (i) DXtjt 1 (i)

(4.38)
where k is the 6x2 Kalman gain matrix which is not yet specied. It is easy to show
that the one-step-ahead forecast of the state vector is:
Xtjt 1 (i) = BXt 1jt 1 (i) (4.39)
I can plug the (4.39) into the (4.38) to get the law of motion for rm is estimate of
the current state vector
Xtjt (i) = BXt 1jt 1 (i) + k

zt (i) DXtjt 1 (i)

(4.40)
By integrating the (4.40) over rms (i.e.
R
Xtjt (i) di  Xtjt) one gets
Xtjt = BXt 1jt 1 + kD

Xt  Xtjt 1

(4.41)
This result follows from the observing that on aggregate the signal noise washes out
(i.e.
R
et (i) di = 0) and henceZ
zt (i) di = DXt +
Z
et (i) diZ
zt (i) di = DXt
By using the transition equation (4.33) to get rid of Xt in the equation (4.41) I obtain
Xtjt = BXt 1jt 1 + kD

BXt 1 + but  Xtjt 1

Then by integrating the (4.39), which yields the average prior forecast (i.e. Xtjt 1 =
BXt 1jt 1), one notices that the above equation can be rewritten as
Xtjt = Xtjt 1 + kD

BXt 1 + but  Xtjt 1

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Gathering the common terms yields
Xtjt = [I  kD]BXt 1jt 1 + kD

BXt 1 + but

(4.42)
which can be regarded as the law of motion for the average estimates of the current
state vector.
It is convenient to dene the 6x3 vector ' such that
' 

  I3
... (1  )  I3
0
Then one can note the following
'0X(1)t = Ft (4.43)
It is easy to prove that equation (4.43) is indeed true by working as follows
'0X(1)t =

()  I3
... (1  )  I3


264 X(1)t  
F
(1)
t
375 (4.44)
'0X(1)t = X
(1)
t + (1  )F(1)t
Let me introduce the following notations:
x
(k 1)
tjt  x
(k)
t ; 8k  1; x(0)t  xt (4.45)
where xt is an arbitrary random variable. Hence I can write
'0X(1)t = X
(0)
tjt + (1  )F
(0)
tjt
Moreover, it is easy to derive an equation for Ftjt from equation (4.29)
F
(0)
tjt =
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j)tjt
Combining the last two equations yields
'0X(1)t = X
(0)
tjt + (1  )
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j)tjt
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Some easy manipulations lead to
'0X(1)t = ()X
(0)
tjt +
1X
j=1
(1  )j X(j)tjt
=
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j 1)tjt
Now recall equation (4.45) to nally write
'0X(1)t =
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j)t
Comparing this equation with the (4.29) concludes the proof of (4.43). Now one can
plug equation (4.42) into equation (4.43) to get
Ft =
h
'0   ekDiBXt 1jt 1 + ekD BXt 1 + but (4.46)
where ek  '0k. One can prove the following three facts:
FACT 1
'0B =

B+(1  )G ... ((1  ))H

FACT 2
DB =

D1B
... 02x3

(4.47)
=

By
... 02x3

where By   B01 B03 0 and Bj stands for the j-th row of B.
FACT 3
Db = D1b
=

1 0
0 1

= I (2)
Then note that the FACT 3 can be used to show that
ekDbut = ekut
The FACT 2 allows is to get the following results:
ekDBXt 1 = ekByXt 1
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and ekDBXt 1jt 1 = ekByXt 1jt 1
Then the FACT 1 can be used in order to prove the following result
'0BXt 1jt 1 = BXt 1jt 1+(1  )GXt 1jt 1+ (1  )H  Ft 1jt 1
By collecting all these results one can rewrite equation (4.46) as follows
Ft =
h
B+(1  )G  ekByiXt 1jt 1+(1  )HFt 1jt 1 + ekByXt 1 + ekut (4.48)
Next, I will work out the vector Ft 1 from Ft 1jt 1, since I want to rewrite equation
(4.48) in a form that is comparable to that conjectured in equation (4.33) so as I can
compare my initial guess. One should start from equation (4.43) to get
(1  )  Ftjt = Ft   Xtjt
By lagging the last equation by one period, one gets
(1  )  Ft 1jt 1 = Ft 1   Xt 1jt 1 (4.49)
I can now plug equation (4.49) into equation (4.48) to get
Ft =
h
B+(1  )G  ekByiXt 1jt 1+H Ft 1   Xt 1jt 1+ ekByXt 1 + ekut
Ft =
h
B+(1  )G  ekBy   HiXt 1jt 1+H  Ft 1 + ekByXt 1 + ekut (4.50)
Now equation (4.50) has the same form as the bottom rows of equation (4.33) because
Xt 1jt 1 does not depend on neither Xt 1 nor Ft 1. Thus I can make the following
identications:
G=ekBy (4.51)
d = ek (4.52)
and h
B+(1  )G  ekBy   Hi != 0
By substituting (4.51) into the last equation one obtainsh
B  ekBy  Hi != 0
H
!
= B  ekBy (4.53)
which identies the matrix H.
The matrix k is the steady-state matrix of Kalman gains which is well-known to
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be equal to
k = PD0

DPD0 +e
 1 (4.54)
with the matrix P that solves the following algebraic Riccati equation
P = B
h
P PD0 DPD0 +e 1DPiB0 + bub0 (4.55)
and where By   B01 B03 0 and Bj stands for the j-th row of B.
Since B and b turn out to be function of P, the ultimate goal is to nd out
the xed-point of a larger equation to solve for P, specied solely in terms of model
parameters. Computationally, nding this xed point turns out to be fast and reliable.
This makes the ICKM suitable for estimation.
The loop to numerically nd out a REE is the following: given a set of parameter
values and a guess for the Kalman-gain matrix k0, one has to characterize the matrices
G, H, and d through equations (4.51)-(4.53). Then one has to solve the algebraic
Riccati equation (4.55) for P and obtain a new Kalman-gain matrix k through the
equation (4.54). Then if the new Kalman-gain matrix is su¢ ciently close to the guess,
one has just found the xed point and stops, otherwise one goes through another loop
by using the matrix k as a new guess for the Kalman-gain matrix. Once a xed point
is found, one can use the resulting Kalman-gain matrix to fully characterize the state-
space system of the ICKM model described in (4.33)-(4.34) through (4.51)-(4.55),
which combined with the equations (4.31)-(4.32) delivers the equilibrium dynamics
of the log-deviations of real output and ination.
Appendix C Information ows
As shown in the main text, the information ow a is measured as follows:
a  H

atjzt 1a;i

 H  atjzta;i (4.56)
Since at and za;i;t are Gaussian, I can write:
H
 
atjzta;i
  1
2
log2

2e  V AR  atjzta;i (4.57)
First, let me focus on the mapping
V AR
 
atjzta;i

= g (~a; a)
The mapping ga (:) can be implicitly characterized through the Kalman lter. The
standard Kalman-equation for updating conditional variances is:
V AR
 
atjzta;i

= V AR

atjzt 1a;i

 
V AR

atjzt 1a;i
2
V AR

atjzt 1a;i

+ ~2a
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One can show that V AR

atjzt 1a;i

= V AR

at 1jzt 1a;i

+ 2a. Plugging this result
into the equation above and some straightforward manipulations yield
V AR
 
atjzta;i

=
h
V AR

at 1jzt 1a;i

+ 2a
i
~2a
V AR

at 1jzt 1a;i

+ 2a + ~
2
a
Note that
~2a = 0 =) V AR
 
atjzta;i

= 0
~2a  !1 =) V AR
 
atjzta;i

= V AR (at)  !1
where the last result follows from the fact that at follows a random walk. After
manipulating a bit I obtain the quadratic equation:
V AR
 
atjzta;i
2
+ V AR
 
atjzta;i

2a = 
2
a~
2
a
This admits two solutions. There exists a unique acceptable solution (V AR

atjzta;i


0) though, that is
V AR
 
atjzta;i

=
 2a +
p
4a + 4
2
a~
2
a
2
Note that I can write:q
4a + 4
2
a~
2
a = 2V AR
 
atjzta;i

+ 2a
~2a =
h
2V AR

atjzta;i

+ 2a
i2
42a
  
2
a
4
and nally,
~2a =
h
2V AR

atjzta;i

+ 2a
i2
42a
  
2
a
4
(4.58)
Now I need to nd an expression for V AR

atjzta;i

in terms of the information ow
a and the variance a.
Combining the equations (4.56) and (4.57) yields
a = H

atjzt 1a;i

 H  atjzta;i
a =
1
2
log2
 
V AR
 
atjzt 1i

V AR (atjzti)
!
Since rms observe innitely many signals, V AR
 
atjzt 1i

= V AR
 
atjzti

+a. Hence
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I obtain:
a =
1
2
log2
 
V AR
 
atjzti

+ 2a
V AR (atjzti)
!
If one inverts this equation, one obtains:
V AR
 
atjzti

=
2a
22a   1 (4.59)
Plugging this result into equation (4.58) leads to:
a =
1
2
log2
264 1
~2a
2a
+ 14
 1
2   12
+ 1
375 (4.60)
This is the mapping ga in equation (3.3).
An analytical closed-form solution for the mapping gm in equation (3.3) cannot
be derived. I computationally approximate this mapping. To do that, I need to
compute the conditional entropies H

mtjzt 1m;i

and H

mtjztm;i

. Since the state mt
and signals zm;i;t are Gaussian, one can show that the conditional entropy is:
H
 
mtjz1;i

=
1
2
log2

2e  V AR  mtjz1;i (4.61)
Hence, I have to characterize the conditional variances of V AR

mtjz1;i

,  2 ft  1; tg.
Let me dene the variance-covariance matrices:
Ptj  E
h 
Xt   E
 
Xtjzi
  
Xt   E
 
Xtjzi
0 jzi i
for  2 ft  1; tg, where Xt 

X0t
... F0t
0
, Xt  [mt;mt 1; at]0, and
Ft 
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1 X(j)t
as dened in appendix B. It is easy to see that V AR

mtjzt 11;i

= Ptjt 1 [1; 1] and
V AR

mtjzt1;i

= Ptjt [1; 1], where the numbers within square brackets denote the
matrix component of interest. The matrix Ptjt 1 is nothing but the matrix P in
appendix B. See equation (4.55). The matrix Ptjt is dened as:
Ptjt  Ptjt 1  Ptjt 1D0

DPtjt 1D0 +e
 1
DPtjt 1 (4.62)
where the matrices D and e have been dened in (4.36) and in (4.37), respectively.
Thus, after one has characterized the xed point as discussed in appendix B,
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one can use the resulting matrix P and equation (4.62) to pin down the conditional
variances V AR

mtjz1;i

, for  2 ft  1; tg, the condition entropies H

mtjzm;i

,
for  2 ft  1; tg, through equation (4.61), and nally the information ow m 
H

mtjzt 1m;i

 H

mtjztm;i

.
Appendix D The Imperfect CommonKnowledge
Phillips Curve
The linearized price index can be written as:
0 =  ^t + (1  )
Z
p^j;tdj
By rearranging: Z
p^j;tdj =

1   ^t
Recall that we dened p^j;t = lnP

j;t   lnPt and ^t = lnPt   lnPt 1   ln,Z
lnP j;tdj   lnPt =

1   (lnPt   lnPt 1   ln)
and then Z
lnP j;tdj =
1
1   lnPt  

1   (lnPt 1 + ln)
By rearranging:
lnPt =  (lnPt 1 + ln) + (1  )
Z  
lnP j;t

dj (4.63)
The price-setting equation is:
E
"
t
"
(1  ) + mcj;t
pj;t
#
yj;tjIj;t
#
+
+ E
" 1X
s=1
()s t+s
"
(1  )s + 
mcj;t+s
pj;t
(s=1t+ )
#
yj;t+sjIj;t
#
= 0
We can write
E

t
h
1   + mcj;ecmcj;t bpj;ti yj;tjIj;t+
+ E
 1X
s=1
()s t+s
h
(1  )s + mcj;ecmcj;t+s bpj;t+Ps=1 ^t+ i yj;t+sjIj;t
!
= 0
where the variables denoted withbare the log-linear deviations from the steady state.
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First realize that the square brackets are equal to zero at the steady state and hence
we do not care about the terms outside them. Taking the derivatives yields:
E
"
mcj;
 cmcj;t   bpj;t+ 1X
s=1
()s
"
mcj;
 cmcj;t+s   bpj;t + sX
=1
^t+
!#
jIj;t
#
= 0
We can take the term bpj;t out of the sum operator in the second term and gather the
common term to obtain:
E
"
mcj;cmcj;t   mcj; 1
1   bpj;t + mcj;
1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s + sX
=1
^t+
!
jIj;t
#
= 0
Recall that bpj;t = lnP j;t   lnPt and cannot be taken out of the expectation operator.
We need to take two steps to do that. First, we write:
E

mcj;cmcj;t   mcj; 1
1  
 
lnP j;t   lnPt
 jIj;t+
+ E
"
mcj;
1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s + sX
=1
^t+
!
jIj;t
#
= 0
and then
mcj;
1   lnP

j;t = E

mcj;cmcj;t + mcj; 1
1   lnPt

jIj;t

+
+E
"
mcj;
1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s + sX
=1
^t+
!
jIj;t
#
By simplifying the common coe¢ cients:
lnP j;t = (1  )E
"cmcj;t + 1
1   lnPt +
1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s + sX
=1
^t+
!
jIj;t
#
(4.64)
Rolling this equation one step ahead yields:
lnP j;t+1 = (1  )E
cmcj;t+1 + 1
1   lnPt+1jIj;t

+
+E
" 1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s+1 + sX
=1
^t++1
!
jIj;t
#
Take rm js conditional expectation at time t on both sides and apply the law of
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iterated expectations:
E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t

= (1  )E
cmcj;t+1 + 1
1   lnPt+1jIj;t

+
+E
" 1X
s=1
()s
 cmcj;t+s+1 + sX
=1
^t++1
!
jIj;t
#
We can take cmcj;t+1 inside the sum operator and write:
E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t

= (1  )E

1
1   lnPt+1jIj;t

+
+E
"
1

1X
s=1
()s cmcj;t+s + 1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
^t++1jIj;t
#
Therefore,
1X
s=1
()s E [cmcj;t+sjIj;t] = 
1  

E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t
  E (lnPt+1jIj;t)+(4.65)
 
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t]
The equation (4.64) can be rewritten as:
lnP j;t = (1  )

E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + 1
1  E [lnPtjIj;t]

+
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s E [cmcj;t+sjIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] (4.66)
By substituting the result in equation (4.65) we obtain:
lnP j;t = (1  )

E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + 1
1  E [lnPtjIj;t]

+
+ 

E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t
  E (lnPt+1jIj;t)+
  (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] (4.67)
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Consider the last term:
(1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] = (1  )E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=2
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t]
and then
(1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] = (1  )E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
 
sX
=1
[(E [^t++1jIj;t])] + E [^t+1jIj;t]
!
Therefore we can write that
(1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] = (1  )E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
 1X
s=1
()s+1
!
E [^t+1jIj;t]
Note that  1X
s=1
()s+1
!
=
()2
1  
Hence,
(1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] = (1  )E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t] +
+ ()2 E [^t+1jIj;t]
and by simplifying:
(1  )
1X
s=1
()s
sX
=1
E [^t+ jIj;t] = E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t]
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We substitute this result into the original equation to get:
lnP j;t = (1  )

E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + 1
1  E [lnPtjIj;t]

+
+ 

E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t
  E (lnPt+1jIj;t)+
  (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t] +
+ E [^t+1jIj;t] +
+ (1  )
1X
s=1
()s+1
sX
=1
E [^t++1jIj;t] (4.68)
After simplifying we get:
lnP j;t = (1  )

E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + 1
1  E [lnPtjIj;t]

+ 

E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t
  E (lnPt+1jIj;t)+ E [^t+1jIj;t] (4.69)
We can rearrange:
lnP j;t = (1  )E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + E [lnPtjIj;t]
+ 

E
 
lnP j;t+1jIj;t

+ E [^t+1jIj;t]  E (lnPt+1jIj;t)

(4.70)
Note that by denition ^t+1  lnPt+1   lnPt   ln. Hence we can show that
lnP j;t = (1  )  E [cmcj;tjIj;t] + (1  )E [lnPtjIj;t]
+   E  lnP j;t+1jIj;t   ln (4.71)
We denote the rm j0s average k-th order expectation about an arbitrary variable
x^t as
E(k) (x^tjIj;t) 
Z
E
Z
E

: : :
Z
E (x^tjIj;t) dj

: : : jIj;t

djjIj;t

dj
where expectations and integration across rms are taken k times.
Let us denote the average reset price as lnP t =
R
lnP j;tdj. We can integrate
equation (4.71) across rms to obtain an equation for the average reset price:
lnP t = (1  )  cmc(0)tjt + (1  ) lnP (1)tjt
+  lnP
(1)
t+1jt    ln (4.72)
where we use the claim of the proposition above. Keep in mind that the price index
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equation can be manipulated to get equation (4.63)
lnPt =  (lnPt 1 + ln) + (1  ) lnP t (4.73)
Let us plug the equation (4.72) into the equation (4.73):
lnPt =  lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln (4.74)
+ (1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(0)tjt + (1  ) lnP (1)tjt +  lnP (1)t+1jti
It is easy to show that for any k 2 f1; 2; : : :g:
lnP
(k)
tjt =  lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln (4.75)
+ (1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(k+1)tjt + (1  ) lnP (k+1)tjt +  lnP (k+1)t+1jt i
Substituting the equation (4.75) associated with k = 1 into the equation (4.74):
lnPt =  lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln (4.76)
+ (1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(1)tjt +  lnP (1)t+1jti
+ (1  ) (1  ) [ lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln]
+ (1  ) (1  )
h
(1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(2)tjt +  lnP (2)t+1jtii
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 lnP (2)tjt
Plugging the equation (4.75) associated with k = 2 into the equation (4.76):
lnPt =  lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln
+ (1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(0)tjt +  lnP (1)t+1jti
+ (1  ) (1  ) [ lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln]
+ (1  )2 (1  )
h
(1  )  cmc(1)tjt +  lnP (1)t+1jti
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 [ lnPt 1 + (   (1  )) ln]
+ (1  )3 (1  )2
h
(1  )  cmc(2)t +  lnP (2)t+1jti
+ (1  )3 (1  )3 lnP (3)tjt
Keeping on substituting the equation (4.75) associated with larger and larger k up to
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innity into the resulting equation yields:
lnPt =
lnPt 1 + (1  (1  )) ln
(1 + (1  ))
+ (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k cmc(k)tjt
+ (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k lnP (k+1)t+1jt
Use the fact that lnPt = bt + lnPt 1 + ln and from the price index (4.63):
lnPt =  (lnPt 1 + ln) + (1  ) lnP t (4.77)
bt + lnPt 1 + ln =  (lnPt 1 + ln) + (1  ) lnP t (4.78)bt+1 = (   1) (lnPt + ln) + (1  ) lnP t+1 (4.79)
lnP t+1 =
^t+1
1   + lnPt + ln
By using these results we obtain:
bt + lnPt 1 + ln = lnPt 1 + (1  (1  )) ln
(1 + (1  ))
+ (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k cmc(k)tjt
+ (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k lnP (k+1)tjt
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k ^(k+1)t+1jt
+
(1  )
1  (1  ) (1  )| {z }
(1 )
1+(1 )
ln
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By simplifying and rearranging:
bt =   (1  )
1 + (1  ) (lnPt 1 + ln)
+ (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k cmc(k)tjt
+ (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k lnP (k+1)tjt
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k ^(k+1)t+1jt
Let us focus on the rst term on the rhs:
  (1  )
 (1 + (1  )) (lnPt 1 + ln) =
  (1  )
1  (1  ) (1  ) (lnPt 1 + ln)
=   (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k (lnPt 1 + ln)
By using this result in the equation above we can write:
bt = (1  ) (1  ) 1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k cmc(k)tjt
+ (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k
0BBBB@lnP (k+1)tjt   lnPt 1   ln| {z }

(k+1)
tjt
1CCCCA
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k ^(k+1)t+1jt
and hence:
bt + lnPt 1 + ln = (1  ) (1  ) 1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k cmc(k)tjt
+ (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k (k+1)tjt
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k (1  )k ^(k+1)t+1jt
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We use the assumption of common knowledge in rationality to obtain:
^t = (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k cmc(k)t +  1X
k=0
(1  )k ^(k+1)t+1jt :
Appendix E Verifying the Guess
The transition equations of the model can be written as:
y^t   ^t = Et

y^t+1   ^t+1

+
1

Et^t   1

R^t (4.80)
^t = (1  ) (1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k
h


y^
(k+1)
tjt   ^
(k+1)
tjt

  z(k)tjt   a
(k)
a;tjt
i
+ 
1X
k=0
(1  )k b(k+1)t+1jt (4.81)
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r)

 (^t   ^t ) + y
 
y^t   zt   aa;t

+ rr;t (4.82)
To solve the model we need the following assumption (see also Nimark, 2007).
Assumption of common knowledge in rationality: It is true thatZ
Ej;t : : :
Z
Ej;t| {z }
s
'
(0:k)
t+hjt+h =M
h'
(s:k+s)
tjt
.
This assumption implies that agents use the actual law of motion of higher-order
beliefs to forecast the dynamics of the higher-order beliefs. The following claims turn
out to be useful:
CLAIM: s(s)tjt = v0
(s)T(s)'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1, where
 (s) =

I6(k+1 s);06(k+1 s)6s
0
T(s) =

06(k+1 s)6s; I6(k+1 s)

and for any 0  s  k.
Proof. We conjectured that st = v0'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1.
s
(s)
tjt = v0'
(s:k+s)
tjt + v1R^t 1
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Since we truncate beliefs after the k-th order we have that
s
(s)
tjt = v0
(s)T(s)'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1; for any 0  s  k
CLAIM: s(s)t+1jt = v0M
(s)T
(s)
'
(0:k+s)
tjt + v11
T
3 st, where
 (s) =

I6(k+1 s);06(k+1 s)6s
0
T(s) =

06(k+1)6s; I6(k+1)

and for any 0  s  k.
Proof. We conjectured that st+1 = v0'
(0:k)
t+1jt+1 + v1R^t. Common knowledge in
rationality implies that
s
(s)
t+1jt = v0M'
(s:k+s)
tjt + v1R^
(s)
tjt
Since R^t 2 Ij;t, all j, then we can write:
s
(s)
t+1jt = v0M'
(s:k+s)
tjt + v11
T
3

v0'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1

Since we truncate beliefs after the k-th order we have that
s
(s)
t+1jt = v0M
(s)T
(s)
'
(0:k)
tjt + v11
T
3

v0'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1

= v0M
(s)T
(s)
'
(0:k)
tjt + v11
T
3 st
The Euler equation (4.80) implies:
b0'
(0:k)
tjt + b1R^t 1  
 
1T5 + 1
T
6

'
(0:k)
tjt = b0M'
(0:1)
tjt + b1

c0'
(0:k)
tjt + c1R^t 1

   1T5 + 1T6 M'(0:1)tjt
+
1

h
a0M'
(0:1)
tjt + a1

c0'
(0:k)
tjt + c1R^t 1
i
  1


c0'
(0:k)
tjt + c1R^t 1

and hence,
b0 = 1
T
5 + 1
T
6 + b0M+b1c0  
 
1T5 + 1
T
6

M+
1

(a0M+a1c0)  1

c0
b1 = b1c1 +
1

a1c1   1

c1
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The Phillips curve (4.81) can be rewritten as:
a0'
(0:k)
tjt + a1R^t 1 =
= (1  ) (1  ) 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s 1T2
h
v0
(s+1)T(s+1)'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1
i
+
+ (1  ) (1  )
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
h
 

(s+1)0g + 
(s)0
a

'
(0:k)
tjt
i
+
+
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s 1T1
h
v0M
(s+1)T(s+1)'
(0:k)
tjt + v11
T
3

v0'
(0:k)
tjt + v1R^t 1
i
where
(s)g =

016s; (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1) ;016(k s)

and
(s)a =

016s; (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0) ;016(k s)
0
:
Therefore we obtain:
a0 = (1  ) (1  ) 
"
m1  
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s

(s+1)0g + 
(s)0
a
!#
+ m2 + 
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T1 v11
T
3 v0
a1 = (1  ) (1  )
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T2 v1 + 
 
k 1X
s=0
(1  )s
!
1T1 v11
T
3 v1
where
m1 
2666664

1T2 v0
(1)T(1)

(1  ) 1T2 v0 (2)T(2)
(1  )2 1T2 v0 (3)T(3)
...
(1  )k 1 1T2 v0 (k)T(k)
3777775 ;
m2 
26666666664
h
1T1 v0M
(1)T
(1)
i
(1  )
h
1T1 v0M
(2)T
(2)
i
(1  )2
h
1T1 v0M
(3)T
(3)
i
...
(1  )k 1
h
1T1 v0M
(k)T
(k)
i
37777777775
;
 = 11k
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Finally the Taylor rule (4.82):
c0'
(0:k)
tjt +c1R^t 1 = rR^t 1+
+ (1  r)

a0'
(0:k)
tjt + a1R^t 1   1T3 '
(0:k)
tjt

+ (1  r)y

b0'
(0:k)
tjt + b1R^t 1  
 
1T1 + 1
T
2

'
(0:k)
tjt

+ 1T4 '
(0:k)
tjt
and then
c0 = (1  r)
 
a0   1T3

+ (1  r)y
 
b0  
 
1T1 + 1
T
2

+ 1T4
c1 = r + (1  r)

a1 + yb1

Appendix F The Law of Motion of the Average
Beliefs
This section shows how to derive the law of motion of the average expectation. This
step is required in order to solve the model. Firmsreduced-form state-space model
is
Xt =W Xt 1 +U  "t (4.83)
The average expectations of Xt follows
X
(1)
tjt = (I KD)WX
(1)
t 1jt 1 +KDWXt 1 +KDU"t
where the steady-state matrix of Kalman gains is well-known to be equal to
K = PD0

DPD0 +e
 1 (4.84)
wheree = QQ0. The variance and covariance matrixP solves the following algebraic
Riccati equation:
P =W
h
P PD0 DPD0 +e 1DPiW0 +UU0 (4.85)
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Note that '(0:1)tjt =
h
't; '
(1:1)
tjt
i0
and that:
't =
26666664
z 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 g 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37777775
| {z }
R1
'
(0:k)
t 1jt 1 +
26666664
z 0 0 0 0 0
0 a 0 0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0
0 0 0 r 0 0
0 0 0 0 ~g 0
0 0 0 0 0 g
37777775
| {z }
R2
 "t
So we can fully characterize the matrices M and N:
M =

R1
0

+

066 066k
06k6 (I KD)Wj(1:6k;1:6k)

+

0
KDWj(1:6k;1:6(k+1))

N =

R2
0

+

0
KDUj(1:6k;1:6)

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